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1 Introduction
This paper develops a micro foundation for consumer search inside stores and analyzes
the effects on welfare and its division when (i) consumers must spend time to learn a
price, (ii) each firm can affect how long the learning takes on average, and (iii) consumers
have a deadline that limits the time to evaluate competing offers. Welfare and its division
are uniquely pinned down.
It is easy to switch from store to store nowadays. In an online search environment,
this can be done by a click of a mouse from a search engine’s results page. The key
frictions of search thereby no longer reside between stores, as assumed by brick-and-mortar
generation search models where search costs are paid up-front, but inside stores. This
changes the search environment in two important respects: First, it makes the time costs
of information processing in a store the main costs of search.1 With a fast broadband
internet connection, the key determinant of these time costs is not how fast computers
process information but how fast consumers can do it.2 Second, it gives firms a role
as controllers of the time cost for their own store. The speed of information processing
by browsing consumers can be strongly affected by the way firms lay out information
on their websites to their visitors. Like a research article can be either easy to read or
incomprehensible, a seller’s website can be either straightforward or maze-like depending
on how it has been organized.3 Also, individual price quotations (words) are easier to
change than the basic template of the whole website (paper).
To study more closely the effects that arise from these changes, this article develops a
novel search model in which there are search frictions only inside stores and not between
stores and where firms have control over the intrafirm frictions in their store. To illustrate
the underlying idea, one could think, for example, that a firm’s total price is composed of
several individual components f1 + ...+fn or that the product has multiple key attributes
(f1, ..., fn), that all need to be attended to individually before buying. By changing the
dimensionality of the problem, n, a firm can thus choose how complicated consumer search
becomes in its store. This easily creates a challenging combinatoric problem.4
To simplify, this paper uses therefore a more reduced form approach: we approximate
the problem continuously by letting each firm freely commit to the rate θ of the Poisson
1For the classic article that introduced the theory of time allocation into economics, emphasizing the
opportunity cost of time, see Becker (1965).
2By this we refer for example to the limits of cognitive processes of information recognition, under-
standing, memorizing and retrieval for later use.
3Our premise is that the time it takes to find a price depends statistically on information complexity
generated by the firm. Data support this. Rubinstein (2007) offers one example in an experimental setup
where they present data on response time in problem solving with variable hardness. Reutskaja et al.
(2011) use eye tracking to measure the consumer search process in a ”supermarket experiment” with
changing time pressure and varying numbers of products.
4See Spiegler (2016) for a review of endogenous choice complexity and consumer obfuscation and
Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2016) for an example of this more complex combinatoric approach to a related problem.
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process P (θ) according to which a consumer finds its price in its store.5 These observable
rates are important to consumers who search under fixed deadlines, which makes them
sensitive to both money and time costs. Deadlines could arise from, say, co-ordination
with others, convex preferences, contractual clauses, etc. Here, we apply fixed deadlines
especially to keep a consumer’s dynamic problem simple and smooth so that the relation
between frictions, prices, and search remains tractable and mostly continuous.6
We thence obtain a setup which resembles brick-and-mortar search models like Varian
(1980) but with the important exception that the typically exogenous partition of con-
sumers into informed (who find two prices), uninformed (who find one price), and the rest
becomes more refined and completely endogenous: it depends on the order in which con-
sumers are searching the firms and on how complicated the acquisition of information has
been made by these firms. Furthermore, additional choice complexity results in reduced
trading because fewer consumers discover sufficient information, which here makes them
incapable or unwilling to complete a purchase. These crucial margins have been ignored
by previous, seminal obfuscation models building on Stahl (1989), like Wilson (2010) and
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), where search costs have also been endogenous.
Our methodology innovation is to show that, by taking the information reducing
effects of strategic complexity properly into account, we can endogenize the intensity of
competition and clarify the relation between frictions to inefficient consumer outcomes.
The incidence of trading failure and the related surplus loss is here a continuous function
of information complexity in the market. We can therefore get a clearer picture on the
effects of frictions on welfare (trades) and its division (prices) than previous work.
The novel economic discovery of this paper is that firms have incentives to make sure
that consumers become informed exactly to the point where equally many of them pur-
chase a product after observing one price and after comparing two prices. This particular
mix alleviates price competition the most. The desirable information outcome can be
achieved by different means: by making independent search more difficult (by ”obfusca-
tion”) or by providing consumers with additional prior information (by ”advertizing”).
Starting with a basic duopoly model, we discover that competitive obfuscation results
only in very limited welfare loss: The first key tradeoff is that, if the firm sets too high
frictions, it loses the highly profitable prominent role, that fastest service would otherwise
grant in the market. Specifically, to gain uncontested market prominence the firm has to
have a rate θ > 2.3, that guarantees that 90 % of the consumers who start from there
find at least its price; this puts an upper bound on the number of frustrated consumers
5We could also talk about the rates at which consumers discover relevant products and gain sufficient
information or understanding about the price. ”Consumer finds a price” is a shorthand for all that.
6To introduce desirable continuity properties in a price competition setup, literature has typically
relied on either continuous distributions for heterogeneous characteristics, e.g., Rob (1985) and Stahl
(1996), or capacity and mobility constraints with symmetric mixed strategies, e.g., Peters (1984). Here
we use deadlines and continuous, gradual information arrival.
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who fail to purchase anything. The second tradeoff of a prominent firm is that lower
frictions allow more consumers to learn about its price but leave them also more time
to evaluate competing offers. This efficiency and extraction tradeoff results in low but
positive frictions.
By contrast, the non-prominent firm’s incentives are aligned partially with the promi-
nent firm and partially with consumers. We can thus prove that there exist two mirror
image equilibria where the numbers of informed consumers and uniformed consumers are
the same and price competition at an intermediate level. The unique duopoly outcome
lies halfway from Diamond equilibrium (the monopoly case, only uninformed consumers)
and Bertrand equilibrium (the competitive case, only informed consumers).
In other words, our new model specification which is motivated by online search yields
a natural refinement to the existing consumer search models, that excludes both para-
doxes by Diamond and Bertrand. This interior outcome results from to the double-sided
commitment that intrafirm frictions give to firms, on the one hand, and that deadlines
give to consumers, on the other hand. Commitment on the consumer side helps them to
avoid the Diamond paradox whereas commitment on the firm side helps them to avoid
the Bertrand paradox. Choice complexity settles at a natural level although no exogenous
costs are involved in adjusting complexity. Previously, obfuscation literature (e.g., Wilson
(2010) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)) has found that firms have incentives to generate
search frictions but has not specified how much and what limits this.
We obtain sharp predictions about obfuscation. Both equilibria feature a faster, promi-
nent firm and a slower, non-prominent firm. This noticeable difference guarantees that
consumers search efficiently from the former to the latter. Firms optimally readjust their
frictions until a clear prominence order arises in the search market. As an important new
observation that might help competition authorities to focus their attention on the right
key players, we also show that the size of trading surplus is determined by the prominent
firm’s incentives and its division by the non-prominent firm’s incentives. In our Poisson
setting, approximately 6 % of the cake is lost. The prominent firm, the non-prominent
firm, and consumers divide the remaining surplus in proportions 2:1:1, respectively. We
could thus say that the market endogenously settles in a ”compromise”.
We generalize our model to study comparative statics between obfuscation and ad-
vertizing, which apparently serve the opposite roles in controlling information availabil-
ity. The nature of price awareness turns to be of significance: increase in narrow price
awareness (price information about the prominent firm only) increases obfuscation by
the prominent firm whereas additional general price information (price information about
both firms or the non-prominent firm) decreases obfuscation by the prominent firm and,
thus, improves welfare.
To analyze a market with three firms, we extend the symmetric framework in Baye
et al. (1992), replacing their continuum of asymmetric equilibria by a finite number;
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the uniqueness of equilibrium arises under strong information asymmetry. We find that
competition expands information in that the numbers of fully and partially informed
consumers exceed the number of uninformed consumers. Vanishing captive demand and
more elastic demand from informed consumers imply that the last prominent firm benefits
more from a fast service rate.
This paper is organized in the following way. We next discuss most related literature
and then lay out the model in Section 3. This section describes optimal search and prices
and defines their relation to intrafirm frictions. We also consider the effects of improving
search efficiency. The equilibrium is constructed in Section 4 starting from the finding that
Bertrand and Diamond equilibria cannot arise in duopolies. We generalize our basic model
in Section 5 to consider the effects of advertizing and competition on obfuscation. Using
a closely related all-pay-auctions model, we also provide some additional applications of
strategic complexity to politics, innovation, and lobbying. Section 6 offers a concluding
discussion. Proofs appear in Appendix.
2 Literature
Our paper is closely related to literatures on (i) oligopolistic price competition and equilib-
rium price dispersion (e.g., Butters (1977), Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Reinganum (1979),
Burdett and Judd (1983), Morgan et al. (2004), Baye et al. (2006a), and Baye et al.
(2006b)), and (ii) endogenous search frictions, strategic complexity and consumer obfus-
cation (e.g., Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Ireland (2007), Carlin and Manso
(2011), Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)).
The nature of equilibria in oligopoly games is known to depend greatly on the strate-
gic variables available in the model. Research suggests that a certain degree of pre-
commitment is crucial to avoid the paradox results by Bertrand (1883) and Diamond
(1971).7 For example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) find that a Bertrand setting where
capacity is fixed results in a Cournot outcome, where the price is above the competitive
price but below the monopoly price. Here time is the limited resource.8
Equilibrium price dispersion arises with ex ante identical consumers, for instance, if
consumers precommit to sample a fixed number of prices (Burdett and Judd, 1983) or
some commit to search at least one price (costly searchers in Stahl (1989)) and others
always search all prices (costless shoppers in Stahl (1989)). Particularly, Stahl (1989)
observes that depending on the exogenous numbers of shoppers and searchers, equilib-
7In the Bertrand case, firms compete their prices down to the marginal cost (result: firms receive
no profits) whereas, in the Diamond case, firms elevate their prices up to the monopoly price (result:
consumers stay at home).
8For the role of limited capacity in avoiding Bertrand outcomes, see also competitive search literature
started by Peters (1984). Geromichalos (2014) finds that gradual relaxation of capacity restrictions leads
back to the Bertrand case.
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rium price distribution spans continuously from the Bertrand case (only shoppers) to the
Diamond case (only searchers). Stahl (1996) explores the properties of equilibria with
continuously distributed search costs. Optimal search and prices pin down the numbers
of consumers who find one price, two prices, etc. The lower part of the search cost dis-
tribution determines competition intensity via the number of shoppers. Non-shoppers
do not fully participate in Janssen et al. (2005) and higher search costs can thus reduce
prices.
Here commitment assumptions are taken to a new level. We demonstrate that with en-
dogenous consumer information and double-sided commitment, to deadlines for consumers
and to intrafirm frictions for firms, the unique equilibrium outcome (up to re-indexing
of the firms) lies exactly in between Bertrand and Diamond outcomes.9 To put it an-
other way, our paper introduces commitment to deadlines as an alternative way to avoid
the issue of non-existence in Diamond (1971), which finds that in a homogenous envi-
ronment even the smallest positive search cost eliminates price dispersion and consumer
search because of the induced hold-up problem. Because stochastic price discovery in our
model always leads to some ex post information differences, price dispersion arises with
ex ante homogenous consumers. Our setup thus nests the workhorse search models of
Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) and endogenizes the key parameter, the share of informed
consumers.10
More obviously, our paper is a study about how consumers search within and across
stores, during a single search spell. Search frictions inside stores are analyzed also by
Petrikaite (2017) and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2016). Most other papers treat a firm more like a
black box, ignoring the internal structure and consumer incentives in a store.11 Akin and
Platt (2014) analyze search between stores with deadlines and show that more limited
ability to recall observed prices can improve consumer welfare. We focus on brief spells of
search where it is easy to recall past prices, say, by opening a new browser tab for each firm
to compare the best prices when time is up. Their model also belongs to a different model
class. Yet, limited recall ability seems like a natural restriction on consumer information
and works quite similarly as obfuscation in controlling the availability of price information
over search path (obfuscation limits information that could later enter into the consumer’s
9Note that the deadline could be one second or one minute: anything positive is enough; we only
need to tremble a bit away from the costly search assumption.
10Giulietti et al. (2014) estimate search frictions in the British electricity market and model the
symmetric pricing behavior by entrants. The incumbent’s market share ranges from 41 to 64 % and
its margins are about twice the lowest margins. Search costs include the cost of estimating annual
consumption and that of finding the cheapest supplier. They must be relatively high to rationalize
switching behavior: one fifth of consumers switches each year.
11However, there is an extensive retailing literature on the effects of store environment on shopping
behavior, e.g., Degeratu et al. (2000) and Donovan et al. (1994). Liang and Lai (2002) observe that
consumers are more likely to visit well-designed online stores (transparent organization, ease of placing
orders, etc.). Kumar et al. (2004) find that complexity of the search task, technology and behavioral
factors determine search performance in electronic shopping.
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awareness, limited recall ability erases previously observed information from information
sets). Future work could take up these ideas.
In the obfuscation literature, the closest articles are Wilson (2010) and Ellison and
Wolitzky (2012). In an asymmetric model, Wilson (2010) finds that duopolies have a
well known non-obfuscating firm and a less known obfuscating firm. Although it hurts it
relative to its peer, one of the firms is willing to assume the non-prominent role because
specialization allows the firms to divide the market more peacefully.12 In a symmetric
model, Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) show that, if a consumer’s search cost is convex in
search time,13 a firm has an incentive to increase the time the consumer searches inside
its store because doing so raises the cost of search for the next store that the consumer
might subsequently visit. This makes the hold-up problem stronger.
Although these motives for obfuscation are quite close to ours, previous welfare analysis
is restricted. Particularly, neither Wilson (2010) nor Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) endo-
genizes the availability of information, which is our main concern in this article. Both
assume that making prices harder to find has no penalty effect on firms through fewer
consumers who are willing or capable of purchasing from them. This lack of penalty is
apparently the primary reason why their models could have many equilibria with different
welfare properties.
Our more precise analysis shows that equilibrium obfuscation has relatively limited
effects on welfare although it could have large competition reducing effects.14 There has
been recently waking interest in such natural limits to equilibrium obfuscation. For in-
stance, Gamp (2016) studies the effects of uninformed purchases (buying without knowing
the price nor the match value) on market prices, product design, and obfuscation. Obfus-
cation encourages uninformed purchases but deteriorates consumers’ expectations about
their products.15,16
12There is hence a tendency for firms to differentiate themselves vertically. Motta (1993) shows the
incentive is generally strongest under price competition.
13With a deadline at t = q, search costs feature an extreme form of convexity here: they are 0 for
t < q (before the deadline) and ∞ for t ≥ q (after the deadline).
14Taylor (2017) shows that obfuscation could even increase welfare acting as a sorting device. This
sorting role of search costs appears first in Petrikaite (2017).
15Our findings can also be juxtaposed with papers about market prominence. If lower search costs
or faster consumer service is interpreted as a vertical quality variable, as would be natural, our findings
rhyme with those in Armstrong et al. (2009). They show that, without vertical product differences,
prominent firm has lower prices and profit (e.g., Rhodes (2011)) but, with them, it is the other way (e.g.,
Arbatskaya (2007)). We find that the first prominent store is faster and has therefore also higher prices
and profit.
16Our model has also connections with competitive search models a` la Peters (1991), Moen (1997), and
Burdett et al. (2001): While we analyze a market where firms commit to search frictions that indirectly
advertize their price, competitive search models explore a market where firms commit to prices that
indirectly advertize their search frictions. In both cases, these frictions are modeled by a Poisson process.
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3 Model
There are two firms i ∈ {1, 2} selling identical products and a unit mass of consumers
looking for one product each. Both firms have the same constant unit production costs
normalized to zero and the consumer valuation for a product is set to one. So far all is
standard. We next make two new assumptions relative to previous literature, however.
First, we endow all consumers with a finite time budget for doing their shopping. To
simplify, all consumers are assumed have the same deadline equal to unity. That is, there
are no search costs before the deadline but infinite costs thereafter.17 Obviously, this
implies that consumers no longer follow a standard static stopping rule.18 As shopping
is costless up to the deadline, all consumers search for better products for a unit of time
and then stop to buy the best product they have so far discovered. Our new assumption
thus grants them a degree of search commitment and makes consumers less sensitive to
hold-up problems in the first store, which usually arise in costly sequential search.19
A deadline could arise, for example, because
• Sometimes the consumer actually has a deadline prior to which the purchase has
to be made: a flight ticket must be reserved before the plane takes off, a birthday
present must be purchased before the party, the ingredients are needed before the
dinner is cooked, which should occur before everybody is starving, etc.
• To coordinate with the rest of the society, it is customary to organize one’s daily life
so that some hours are allocated to work and other hours to more leisurely activities
like shopping, etc. With several pressing matters on the to-do list, there is often a
limit on how much time can be allocated to completing one purchase.
• With convex preferences, many people enjoy doing different activities in moder-
ate amounts, avoiding extremes: shopping might be a pleasure first but become a
nuisance later, say, after two hours of shopping.
• To take a behavioral perspective, consumers with time inconsistent preferences, who
tend to shop excessively long from the point of view of their normal selves, may use
a deadline to restrict their shopping behavior.
Second, we let firms compete over consumers’ restricted time resources. To study firms’
basic incentives to make adjustments to their intrafirm search technology, we give them
17We explore a resembling setup where the deadline can be either random or fixed in a companion
paper (Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 2016). In the first case, consumers search until they are hit by a random deadline
shock (they get fed up) whereas, in the second case, consumers search until they hit their fixed deadline
(they run out of time). In this paper firms have several potentially interesting products in their store
and the expected price consumers get from a firm is decreasing in the time they spend on the firm.
18See Weitzman (1979) or Wolinsky (1986).
19See Diamond (1971) for a classic example.
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full control over the search frictions that consumers face in their store. Specifically, we let
each firm i freely commit to any observable intensity θi ∈ [0,∞]20 of the Poisson process
P (θi), which governs how fast consumers find products in its store: loosely speaking, we
thus assume that, if a consumer searches in a given store for a very short time interval
dt = t1 − t0 > 0, her probability of finding the product that the firm has from t0 to t1 is
θidt. We consider the limiting case where this interval becomes infinitesimal, dt→ 0.
In general, we recommend that it is best to view θi as a reduced form metaphor of
information complexity generated by firm i. In practice, this could involve some aspects
of customer service, or refer to price, store, or generally choice complexity (see Spiegel,
2016). For example, one could think that a firm’s total expected price is composed of
multiple individual components f i1 + ... + f
i
n (base line price and the add-ons, discounts
for special groups, shipping fees, support costs if something goes wrong later, etc.) or
that to identify relevant products the consumer needs to check through multiple fea-
tures (f i1, ..., f
i
n) before she can consider buying the product (Is the size and the color
right? Is it machine-washable at 60 degrees? Does the brand have a reputation for qual-
ity? etc.).21,22Assuming here that f ik’s (k = 1, ..., n) are observed one by one, search
complexity depends then on the dimensionality of the search problem, n, and the web-
page’s navigation parameters, which can render the (shortest) click paths from f il to f
i
l+1
(l = 1, ..., n− 1) either longer or shorter. To capture these related ideas by one model, we
apply a parsimonious interpretation which assumes that effects of customer service and
information complexity in a firm’s store can be continuously approximated by the right
choice of θi.
We thus assume that a firm can either put sand or oil in the wheels for search inside its
store. Nevertheless, since rates θi affect the order in which consumers search in different
stores, in doing so, the firm has to keep in mind that lower rates are less attractive to
consumers and can hence place it at the bottom of their search order. Firms are therefore
competing in frictions θi and in prices pi ∈ [0, 1]. Equilibrium pricing strategies are
generally randomized.23 We denote by F i ∈ ∆ [0, 1] the price distribution for store i.
Consumer search is then a gradual random process, which takes place in one of the
stores at a time. For every point in time t ∈ (0, 1), a consumer decides whether to search
20Note that we have included in the choice set the boundary values of θi = 0 (finding the price is
almost impossible) and θi = ∞ (finding the price is almost immediate). This ascertains that the firm’s
choice set is not only convex but also compact.
21See, e.g., Spiegler (2006) for complexity related and behavioral aspects of search and Gabaix and
Laibson (2006) for add-on pricing. In these cases consumers only observe one product attribute or a
single price component, f ik. In our model, consumers have more stamina in the sense that they search
until the price is found.
22Even when products are non-homogenous, consumer behavior might be well-described by a 0-1-
match value setup where search is about identifying the cheapest product meeting some criteria. Our
model corresponds to a simplified case where all firms are known to have exactly one suitable product
for each one consumer.
23See Lemmata 4 and 2.
8
in store i = 1 or in store i = 2. In store i = 1, the price, p1, is found at rate θ1 whereas,
in store i = 2, the price, p2, is found at rate θ2.24 A consumer’s search cost is zero for
t ≤ 1 (before the deadline) and infinite for t > 1 (after the deadline). Consumers can
freely move from store to store and recall earlier prices without any costs or delay.25
The precise timing is:
1. Firms set rates θ = (θ1, θ2), which then become public.
2. Firms choose prices p = (p1, p2), that have to be found.
3. Consumers search optimally from t = 0 to t = 1 in one store at a time.
When time is up, t = 1, consumers buy the cheapest observed product.
Thus, we have a three stage extensive game with a dynamic program embedded in the
final stage, or, equivalently for this case, a two stage game where, first, the firms publicly
commit to the frictions and, then, the firms choose their randomized pricing strategies
and the consumers select their sequential search strategies.
3.1 Search
The game next is solved by backwards induction. Without loss of generality, we assume
that θ1 ≥ θ2. Thereby, we denote the expected price in the faster store by E [p1] and
the expected price at the slower store by E [p2]. The expected minimum of both prices is
denoted by E [pmin].
Heuristically, the problem of a consumer can be captured by the Bellman equation,
which gives the value of searching at time t on the condition that the consumer has not
found a price yet:
Vt = maxi=1,2V
i
t , (1)
where
V it = θ
idt
(
(1− e−θ−i(1−t)) (1− E [pmin]) + e−θ−i(1−t)
(
1− E [pi]))+ (1− θidt)Vt+dt.
24Wait times until a price is found are thus drawn from exponential distributions: Exp(θ1) and
Exp(θ2).
25This gives our model a slight flavor of a Poisson bandit problem (see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006)
for a compact review) where each store represents an ”arm”. We operate, however, exceptionally without
discounting and with a finite time horizon. There is also no usual tradeoff between exploitation and
exploration because the arms have a known expected value and they break up after the price is found.
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The consumer chooses between searching for price p1 at store i = 1 (found at rate θ1)
and searching for price p2 at store i = 2 (found at rate θ2). The former gives V 1t and the
latter yields V 2t at time t.
These values are determined by the following basic features of search: If a consumer
searches in firm i’s store during a short interval dt, the probability that she finds its price is
θidt whereas the complementary probability that no price is found is 1−θidt; the value of
continuing the search is Vt+dt. When the first price is discovered, the consumer obviously
switches immediately to the other firm’s store in attempt to find also the other price and
continues searching there either until she finds that price or until the deadline arrives.
As a result, if the first price is observed at time t, the consumer ends finding exactly one
price with probability e−θ
−i(1−t) and exactly two prices with probability 1− e−θ−i(1−t). In
the former case, the consumer buys the product for pi, which is the only price she has
found. In the latter case, the consumer obtains the product for the minimum of pi and
p−i, that is, pmin.
To simplify the following analysis, we assume next that, if both stores look equally
attractive initially, i.e., if V 1t = V
2
t for t = 0, one half of the consumers start their search
from each of them. Moreover, if no reason to switch the stores arises, i.e., if V 1t = V
2
t for
t > 0, a consumer continues to search in the store where she is at the moment.
To characterize consumer search behavior, it therefore remains to determine only how
many consumers start from each firm and whether they have a strict incentive to switch
the store at some intermediate time point t ∈ (0, 1) before their first price discovery.
Conveniently, we can show that consumer incentives are basically stationary:
Lemma 1 Consumers switch the firm only when a price is found.
(i) If θi (1− E [pi]) > θ−i (1− E [p−i]), all consumers start from firm i = 1, 2.
(ii) If θ1 (1− E [p1]) = θ2 (1− E [p2]), consumers may start from either firm.
The choice of the first store is thus ”myopic”. The effect of the deadline vanishes
because of the common continuation value V it+dt = Vt+dt for i = 1, 2, before a price
is found, and because the probability of observing both prices does not depend on the
chosen search order. Note that, if this were a standard bandit problem, the value of each
(arm) firm would be proportional to θi (1− E [pi]).26
Thus, whether the consumer first goes to firm i = 1 or firm i = 2 only depends on
expected prices and search frictions but not on how much time is left. Likewise, even if
there is a tradeoff between frictions and prices, θi > θ−i and E [pi] > E [p−i], consumer
attitude towards it remains constant over time t ∈ [0, 1]. Consumers have therefore no
incentive to switch between stores before a price is found.
This entails that consumer strategy can be represented by the fraction of consumers,
26This together with the terminal condition pins down one solution for the related differential equation.
For more on Exponential-Poisson bandit problems, see, e.g., Keller et al. (2005).
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s1, who start from firm i = 1. The rest of them, s2 = 1− s1, start from firm i = 2. The
two of these are captured together by s = (s1, s2).
Note that in contrast to the usually exogenous consumer partition as in Varian (1980)
and Stahl (1989), the interplay of frictions θ and consumer strategy s now partitions the
set of consumers endogenously into disjoint sets
B0 +B1 +B2 +B1,2 = 1,
where consumers B0 fail to find any price, consumers B1 and B2 (”uninformed consumers”
or ”captives”) find just one of the two prices, p1 or p2, and consumers B1,2 (”informed
consumers” or ”shoppers”) have time to find both.27
The number of consumers observing no price is
B0 = s
1e−θ
1
+ s2e−θ
2
,
and, hence, the number of trades is equal to
1−B0 = 1− s1e−θ1 − s2e−θ2 .
Given that there are no costs in this game, the number of trades is also the only measure
of market efficiency. Notice that full market efficiency, B0 = 0, requires both that all
consumers start from the faster firm, s1 = 1 (the right search order starting from the
fastest firm, ”efficient search”), and that the faster firm serves them immediately, θ1 =∞
(no intrafirm frictions in the faster store, ”efficient service”).
The numbers of captives to each firm are now given by
B1 = s
1θe−θ and B2 = s2θe−θ, if θ = θ1 = θ2, (2)
and
B1 = s
1
∫ 1
0
e−θ
2(1−τ)θ1e−θ
1τdτ = s1
θ1
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2),
=
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 −B0
)
, if θ1 6= θ2, (3)
and
27By contrast, for example in Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) with two firms, these measures would be
B0 = 0, B1 = B2 =
1−µ
2 and B1,2 = µ, where the measure of shoppers is µ ∈ (0, 1).
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B2 = s
2
∫ 1
0
e−θ
1(1−τ)θ2e−θ
2τdτ = s2
θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1),
=
θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
B0 − e−θ1
)
, if θ2 6= θ1. (4)
Above, e−θ
iτ is the probability that the consumer does not find pi during time interval
t ∈ [0, τ ], θidτ is the probability that the consumer observes this price exactly at moment
t = τ , and e−θ
−i(1−τ) is the probability that the consumer does not find p−i during time
interval t ∈ [τ, 1]. The shoppers are then just the residual
B1,2 = 1−B0 −B1 −B2,
= 1−B0
(
1− θ
1
θ1 − θ2 +
θ2
θ1 − θ2
)
− θ
1
θ1 − θ2 e
−θ2 +
θ2
θ1 − θ2 e
−θ1 ,
= 1− θ
1e−θ
2 − θ2e−θ1
θ1 − θ2 , (5)
which shows how the effect of market efficiency through B0(s
1) vanishes. Interestingly,
expressions (3) and (4) also suggest that the faster firm and the slower firm could have con-
flicting incentives regarding efficiency: decreasing market inefficiency B0(s
1) gives more
captives to the faster firm but less captives to the slower firm.
Above notions will be used repeatedly in solving the firm’s problem. It is clear from
there that ∂B1,2
∂s1
= 0, ∂B0
∂s1
< 0, ∂B1
∂s1
> 0 and ∂B2
∂s1
< 0. In consequence, if consumer search
becomes more efficient, the number of shoppers does not change but the number of trades
increases and the faster (slower) firm gains more (less) captives.
3.2 Prices
For any consumer partition {B0, B1, B2, B1,2}, the profit Πi that firm i obtains has, as
standard, a price-insensitive part and a price-sensitive part:
Πi(pi) =
(
Bi +B1,2(1− F−i(pi))
)
pi.
There is inelastic demand Bi from captives who observe one price and elastic demand
B1,2(1− F−i(pi)) from shoppers who compare two prices.
The equilibrium price distribution can now be calculated as in Varian (1980), Stahl
(1989), and Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) for symmetric cases (no atoms) and much like
in Wilson (2010) for asymmetric cases (one atom). In anticipation of our subsequent
findings, we use below the notation which supposes that the faster store has secured more
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captives, B1 ≥ B2:28
Lemma 2 Consider θ = (θ1, θ2) and s = (s1, s2) such that B1 ≥ B2, B1 > 0, and
B1,2 > 0. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium price distribution F = (F
1, F 2) where
F 1(p) =
B2 +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
2
B1,2
1
p
for all p ∈ [p, 1) ,
with an atom α := B1−B2
B1+B1,2
≤ p at the highest price p = 1, and
F 2(p) =
B1 +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
1
B1,2
1
p
, for all p ∈ [p, 1] .
The lowest price is given by p = B1
B1+B1,2
and the firms’ profits by
Π1 = B1 and Π
2 = pB2 + (1− p)B1 ≤ B1.
Observe that both Diamond equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium could arise in our
model, in principle, for suitably chosen frictions θ: if B1,2 = 0 (no shoppers; this would
arise under θ = (0, 0), or θ = (a, 0) and θ = (0, a), for any a > 0), both firms use a pure
strategy p1 = p2 = 1 and, if B1,2 > 0 but B1 = B2 = 0 (no captives; this would arise
under θ = (∞,∞)), both firms use a pure strategy p1 = p2 = 0. Later we prove, however,
that two firms never set θi = 0 or θi =∞ which could lead to these cases.
Generally, the store with more captives has higher prices and profit. It mixes between
offering discount prices, p1 < 1, to compete for shoppers, and setting the monopoly price,
p1 = 1, to tax its captives. The other store, who has a smaller number of captives, only
charges discount prices, p2 < 1. When a firm gives a discount, its size is a random draw
from
[
p, 1
)
distributed according to F 1 or F 2. To keep both firms randomizing over the
same interval despite different profits, F 1 must thus have an atom at unity.
Automatically, the firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies are hardwired so as to let
them specialize in different consumer groups. This aligns their payoffs and helps to relax
the price competition. To see this payoff alignment more clearly, note that the profit
to the high-profit firm, Π1, equals the number of captives it attracts, B1, whereas the
profit to the low-profit firm, Π2, is the weighted average of its own captives, B2, and the
other firm’s captives, B1. Furthermore, the weights, p =
B1
B1+B1,2
and 1 − p = B1,2
B1+B1,2
,
could be taken as a measure of how close the market is to Bertrand equilibrium (p = 0,
arises with B1,2 > 0,B1 = B2 = 0) and to Diamond equilibrium (p = 1, arises with
B1,2 = 0,B1 > 0, B2 ≥ 0). Near the Bertrand equilibrium (p close to zero), the firms
have more closely aligned preferences and, near the Diamond equilibrium (p close to one),
they compete more fiercely. As it later turns out, the outcome that obtains can thus be
regarded as a compromise between consumers and both of these firms. We find that in
equilibrium p = 1/2, B1 = B1,2, and B2 = 0.
28We reverse the notation in Lemma 2 if B2 ≥ B1.
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It is now straightforward to calculate the expected prices for later use:29
E
[
p1
]
=
∫ 1
p
pf 1(p)dp+ α =
Π2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
+ α (6)
≥E [p2] = ∫ 1
p
pf 2(p)dp =
Π1
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
(7)
≥E [pmin] =
∫ 1
p
p
(
f 2(p)
(
1− F 1(p))+ f 1(p) (1− F 2(p))) dp
=
2Π1Π2
B21,2
(
1− p
p
)
− B1Π
2 +B2Π
1
B21,2
ln
(
1
p
)
. (8)
Consumer surplus is the average of net utility to captives and shoppers:
CS = B1
(
1− E [p1])+B2 (1− E [p2])+B1,2 (1− E [pmin]) .
3.3 Improving search efficiency under fixed unobserved
frictions
This paper studies competitive obfuscation in a market where consumers search optimally
for the best deal, the higher of θ1 (1− E [p1]) and θ2 (1− E [p2]). There is no confusion
about which deal is the better one because obfuscation is observable and consumers form
accurate equilibrium beliefs about prices. This could also be interpreted as the long
run limit where each firm’s reputation is constant. To understand the implications of the
assumption, let us assume for a while that it does not hold. If consumers have either biased
information or absolutely no information when they approach the firms, the number of
consumers who start from the faster store could be either too large or too small. We next
suppose that a fixed share of consumers s1 ∈ [0, 1] begins the search from the faster firm.
Proposition 1 analyzes the effects of increasing search efficiency for this alternative case.
Such a change in consumer behavior might arise, for example, if the faster firm intensified
its advertizing.
Proposition 1 Suppose the rates θ1 and θ2 are fixed such that θ1 > θ1. Consider the
effects of increasing search efficiency s1.
1. The faster firm’s profit Π1 increases and the slower firm’s profit Π2 decreases as
search becomes more efficient.
2. The faster firm earns more profit than the slower firm if and only if s1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
.
29Again, these are E
[
p1
]
and E
[
p2
]
assuming B1 ≥ B2 whereas reverse notation is needed for B2 >
B1.
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3. The expected consumer surplus for average consumer is increasing for s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
and decreasing for s1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
.
The first item shows that, while the intensity of price competition adjusts to render
incentives aligned, it does so only up to a limit: the faster firm always benefits and the
slower firm always suffers if more consumers start searching from the former rather than
the latter. Still, the slower firm can extract a higher profit than the faster firm if consumers
are so confused more than θ
2
θ1+θ2
of them start from its store. This implies that firms’
profits converge from s1 = 0 up to θ
2
θ1+θ2
and diverge from there until s1 = 1. Standard
symmetric pricing prevails at s1 = θ
2
θ1+θ2
. This is the point where price competition is
the strongest. The further we move from this point to either direction, the more relaxed
competition becomes.
Higher search efficiency may thus have both positive and negative of effects on con-
sumer surplus. As marked before, s1 reduces B0, which has an increasing effect on B1 :
B1(s
1)′ = θ
1
θ1−θ2B0(s
1)′ > 0 and a decreasing effect on B2 : B2(s1)′ = − θ2θ1−θ2B0(s1)′ < 0;
s1 has no effects on B1,2. On the positive side, consumers are therefore more likely to
find prices for higher s1, which directly shows up in the consumer surplus via 1 − B0 =
B1 + B2 + B1,2. On the negative side, more efficient search also increases prices through
the higher total number of captives, B1 +B2 = β(θ)−B0, where β(θ) = θ1e−θ
2−θ2e−θ1
θ1−θ2 < 1
is a constant that depends on frictions θ which are fixed in this exercise.
Yet even more importantly, the increasing effect of search efficiency on B1 − B2, the
positive effect on B1 and the negative effect on B2, alter the intensity of price competition
in the market. On the one hand, for low levels of s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
, firm i = 2 has higher profit
but improving search efficiency undermines its relative position: B2, α and p become
smaller. On the other hand, for high levels of s1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
, firm i = 1 has higher profit and
improving search efficiency emphasizes its relative position: B1, α and p become larger.
Ultimately, the competition relaxing effects of more pronounced firm differences, captured
by the non-monotone behavior of α around s1 = θ
2
θ1+θ2
, turn out to have the largest impact
on consumer welfare.
We show in Appendix that consumer surplus can be rewritten simply as
CS = (1− α)B1,2 =
 B2−B1B2+B1,2B1,2, for s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
,
B1−B2
B1+B1,2
B1,2, for s
1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
,
which is increasing for s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
(as firm asymmetry α decreases) and decreasing for
s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
(as firm asymmetry α increases). Figure 1 illustrates the general pattern;
the red vertical line captures the symmetric point where s1 = θ
2
θ1+θ2
. The strictly central
position of this red line demonstrates that rational consumers are best off when the other
consumers choose the firm somewhat randomly. With ambiguous effect on expected prices,
consumers who themselves search optimally can therefore either suffer or benefit from
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other consumers’ confusion.
Figure 1: Consumer surplus for different values of search efficiency s1 for θ = (3, 1).
Observe that the effects of higher search efficiency in this paper are more general
than the effects of higher market participation in Janssen et al. (2005): Both increase
the number of costly searchers (here B1 +B2) while keeping fixed the number of costless
shoppers (here B1,2). However, in their symmetric equilibria, each firm obtains the same
number of costly searchers (B1 = B2) whereas, in our asymmetric equilibria, the faster
firm’s share (B1) increases and the slower firm’s share (B2) decreases. This entails that,
in Janssen et al. (2005), additional numbers of uninformed consumers have an increasing
effect on prices whereas here their effect could be increasing or decreasing. Moreover, the
numbers of captives B1 and B2 are non-monotone in the firm’s own frictions θ
1 or θ2 in
this paper, which generates new tradeoffs for demand and prices.
We find it somewhat paradox that the equilibrium in competitive obfuscation, that we
soon describe, features efficient search, which is here shown to minimize consumer surplus.
Seemingly, competition in frictions does more harm to consumers than it benefits them.
Here increased competition in one dimension (rates θ) leads to decreased competition
in another dimension (prices p), with negative effects on consumer surplus. Ignoring
information about intrafirm frictions would thus be best for the average consumer. This
might hint to a new way to rationalize consumer inattention to advertizing.
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3.4 Fixed point in search and prices with observable
frictions
We next move on to analyze observable frictions with optimal prices and search behavior.
Based on the earlier analysis, we find importantly that any pair of frictions generates a
unique fixed point in search and prices:
Proposition 2 For any θ, there exists a unique fixed point in search and prices (s,F)
where F = F(θ, s) and s = s(θ,F). In particular,
1. if θ1 (1− E [p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))]) ≥ θ2 (1− E [p2|(θ, s = (1, 0))]), all consumers start
from the same store, s1 = 1− s2 = 1, B1 > B2 = 0 and E [p1] > E [p2], whereas
2. if θ1 (1− E [p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))]) < θ2 (1− E [p2(θ, s = (1, 0))]), some consumers start
from each store, s1 = 1− s2 < 1, B1 ≥ B2 > 0, where s is the unique solution to
θ2
θ1
=
1− E [p1|(θ, s)]
1− E [p2|(θ, s)] = 1− α, (9)
where α = α(θ, s) is the atom size determined by Lemma 2.
Concerning Proposition 2 note that optimal search behavior (consumer partitionB1, B2
and B1,2) is determined by θ and s jointly whereas pricing (distributions F
1 and F 2 and
expectations E [p1] and E [p2]) depends on θ and s only through consumer partition
B1, B2, and B1,2. This feature enables us to construct a hypothetical price distribution
F(θ, s0) and calculate the expected prices E [p|(θ, s0)] for each pair of intrafirm frictions
and hypothetical consumer strategies (θ, s0) by first deriving the associated consumer par-
tition B1(θ, s
0), B2(θ, s
0), and B1,2(θ, s
0), by Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5), and then the
distributions of prices they induce F(B1, B2, B1,2)(θ, s
0) by Lemma 2. The expectations
of those price distributions (6), (7) and (8) then prompt some new consumer strategies
s1 by Lemma 1. In a fixed point, the starting strategies s0 and the finishing strategies
s1 coincide. The existence of a fixed point can be proved by the continuity of expected
prices E [p] in consumer search s, by spanning from one boundary case s = (1, 0) (where
all consumers start from store i = 1) to another s = (0, 1) (where all consumers start
from store i = 2). The uniqueness is based on the monotonicity of the problem: firms
raise their prices with more captive demand but consumers prefer firms with lower prices.
Proposition 2 has two noteworthy corollaries:
Corollary 1 (Effects of frictions on market prominence) Lower frictions grant a firm
more prominent market position and higher prices and profit: the fastest firm attracts
more captives, B1 ≥ B2, which leads to Π1 ≥ Π2 and E [p1] ≥ E [p2].
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Corollary 2 (Effects of frictions on search efficiency) Consumers search efficiently,
starting from the fastest firm, if the frictions are identical, θ1 = θ2, or if they are very
different, θ1 (1− E [p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))]) ≥ θ2 (1− E [p2|(θ, s = (1, 0))]).
To sum up, there are two kinds of candidate equilibria: symmetric and asymmetric
ones. If the firms are equally fast, one half of the consumers start from each firm and
firms make the same profit using symmetric pricing strategies whereas, if one of the firms
is faster than the other, it wins a more prominent market position and has higher prices
and profit.
We concentrate next on pure strategies in intrafirm frictions although it is obvious that
there could exist also equilibria where the firms mix in frictions.30 Pure strategies seem
more natural, however, because we consider a game in which the frictions are common
knowledge at the beginning of the following subgame where pricing and search decision
are made.
Note that, by Proposition 2, we can now solve (9) to obtain a closed form expression
for s1 = 1− s2:
θ2
θ1
= 1− α = 1−B0 −B1
1−B0 −B2 =
1−B0 −B1
1−B0 − (1− α)B1 ,
θ2
θ1
=
1− s1e−θ1 − (1− s1)e−θ2 − s1 θ1
θ1−θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
1− s1e−θ1 − (1− s1)e−θ2 − s1 θ2
θ1−θ2 (e
−θ2 − e−θ1) ,
=⇒s1 =

1
2
θ1−θ2
θ2
1−e−θ2
e−θ2−e−θ1 , if
1
2
θ1−θ2
θ2
1−e−θ2
e−θ2−e−θ1 ∈ (0, 1)
1, if 1
2
θ1−θ2
θ2
1−e−θ2
e−θ2−e−θ1 ≥ 1,
0, if 1
2
θ1−θ2
θ2
1−e−θ2
e−θ2−e−θ1 ≤ 0.
(10)
Plotting these for different values of θ in Figure 2 shows the general pattern. When
frictions are identical, one half of the consumers starts from each firm. Otherwise, the
faster firm gains a larger share of first timers. Especially, note the jump in their share when
a firm improves its service rate starting from a symmetric situation: to keep consumers
indifferent between the firms, even a slightest (continuous) reduction in frictions must
drastically increase the fraction of consumers starting from the firm. This raises the
number of captives it attracts and elevates its profit and prices – by the amount which
keeps it on par with its competition, θ1 (1− E [p1]) = θ2 (1− E [p2]), despite its now
strictly lower search costs.
30The firms could, for example, mix over some interval which contains the set of pure strategy equi-
librium frictions {1.03, 2.76}. In practice, mixing in intrafirm frictions might involve, say, pre-announced
campaign content on the firm’s site making browsing more sluggish (heavy video content, surveys, new
registration requirements, etc.) or, alternatively, making prices easier to observe (advertizing the price
in more explicit ways).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: The fraction of consumers who start from store 1 as a function of θ1: for different
values of θ2 ≤ 1.0 (a), for different values of θ2 > 1.0 (b).
4 Equilibrium obfuscation
This section contains our main results. First, we rule out the existence of Bertrand
equilibrium and Diamond equilibrium and, generally, the existence of wholly or nearly
symmetric equilibria where a positive number of consumers starts from each firm. We find
that all equilibria feature efficient search such that a clear prominence order is generated
in the search market. By Proposition 1, this asymmetry is not in the consumer’s interest
but relates instead to optimal firm behavior. To understand their incentives better, we
then move on to describe the problems of the prominent firm and the non-prominent firm
and the implications for equilibrium market conditions. We demonstrate that there exists
a unique equilibrium pattern, which is invariant to extensions or reductions in consumers’
deadlines.
4.1 No Bertrand equilibrium nor Diamond equilib-
rium
Bertrand equilibrium is avoided here because, even if one firm served all consumers im-
mediately, the other one would benefit from committing to positive frictions, which split
consumers into segments with different price information. The best response to infinitely
fast competition, θ−i =∞, is a finite service rate, θi = ln(2). In a duopoly setting, unilat-
eral commitment possibility is sufficient to guarantee that only some consumers find both
prices and, therefore, circumvents the price war that would arise if all consumers were
informed about two prices. As a result, both firms make positive profits in this game.
Remark 1 There exists no Bertrand equilibrium, where neither of the firms generates
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any frictions and the market price equals zero.
To see why Bertrand equilibrium is eliminated, it might be useful to take a look at the
game’s extensive form once more. Note that our game is not equivalent with a strategic
game in which firms choose a distribution of prices ∆ [0, 1] and a distribution of rates
∆ [0,∞] simultaneously and consumers choose their search strategies once and for all. In
this case, Bertrand equlibrium (θ,p) = (∞,∞; 0, 0) is not eliminated because the other
firm still gets all consumers never mind what price or frictions a deviating firm sets. Yet,
even in this simultaneous moves modification, Bertrand equilibrium (θ,p) = (∞,∞; 0, 0)
would not be robust to perturbations in pi = 0 or θi = 0: both would make a deviation
to p−i > 0 and θ−i > 0 profitable.
It is also important that firms cannot later readjust their frictions, when some con-
sumers have already found a price or two.31 That is, frictions should represent a firm’s
long-term investment in a particular search technology within its store. This can be mo-
tivated by observing that changing the webpage structure typically involves a larger cost
than changing prices or search. However, if it was feasible to change the frictions after the
other firm has fixed its price, the non-prominent firm would want to maximize its demand
by serving immediately all the consumers who visit it after searching the prominent firm.
If consumers knew this, they would first visit the non-prominent firm. This would make
the prominence order unstable.
Because consumers are committed to searching until their deadline, we can also elim-
inate Diamond equilibrium as a market outcome. Search commitment guarantees that a
firm always receives a positive demand, as a prominent firm or a non-prominent firm, as
long as some consumers find its price. Extremely high frictions, on the other hand, would
mean that all consumers are uninformed about the price of a firm, which can never be in
that firm’s best interest. Here uninformed means incapable or unwilling to buy.
Our later analysis shows that firms have no incentives to generate infinite frictions even
if the consumers who find no price would buy in random; such non-selective consumers
do not exercise much influence over firms. Furthermore, while the symmetric Diamond
equilibrium would give each firm 0.5 with randomly buying consumers (interestingly, only
slightly more that the unique duopoly profit for the prominent firm Π1 ≈ 0.47), a deviation
from (θi, pi) = (∞, 1) to (θi, pi) = (0, 1− ) for small  gives the firm almost 1.
Remark 2 There exists no Diamond equilibrium, where at least one firm generates
infinite frictions and the market price equals one.
More generally we discover that there exist no symmetric equilibria or asymmetric
equilibria where some consumers start from each firm:
31The distribution of consumer information changes along the search horizon, which can alter the firms’
incentives over time if deadlines are observable. We thus prefer a more natural steady-state interpretation
of our model where different consumers can be at different stages of search at the same time.
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Lemma 3 There exists no equlibrium where s1 ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 3 follows from the idea that we can think that both firms are for their respective
parts choosing the value of the ratio ρ = θ1/θ2, keeping fixed the other firm’s choice.
However, since the faster firm maximizes B1 and the slower firm maximizes its convex
combination, pB2 + (1− p)B1 which for s1 < 1 would be B2 = ρ−1B1, both can never be
happy at the same time if s1 < 1 unless they choose the same rates and ρ = 1. Otherwise,
the faster firm cares only about its captives, B1, but the slower firm for a product of this,
B2 = ρ
−1B1, and they have thus conflicting views about the best ρ.
The conflict of interest cannot be resolved before firms become so different that all
consumers start from the faster firm – or remain exactly similar. This of course leaves a
small gap in the proof that might allow us to construct a symmetric equilibrium (in the
spirit of Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)) in addition to an asymmetric equilibrium (in the
spirit of Wilson (2010)). However, as it turns out, firm i’s profit has usually at least two
local maxima, a higher one (with si = 1) and a lower one (with si = 0), and symmetric
frictions with si = 0.5, are dominated by either of these; see Figure 3.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: The profit of firm i = 1 as a function of θ1 for different θ2.
Recall also that, when one firm is only a bit faster than the other one, the profit to
the faster firm is B1 = s
1 θi
θ1−θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
whereas, when both firms are equally fast,
it is 0.5θ2e−θ
2
. While the limit value of the second factor θ
i
θ1−θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
is θ2e−θ
2
as
θ1 → θ2+, the limit value of the first one s1 is not equal to 0.5; see Equation (10). Rather,
lim
θ1→θ2+
s1 = lim
θ1→θ2+
1
2
θ1 − θ2
θ2
1− e−θ2
e−θ2 − e−θ1 =
1
2
1− e−θ2
θ2e−θ2
>
1
2
for θ2 > 0.
There is thus a jump in the profit when reducing the frictions from a symmetric
situation.
Corollary 3 In any equilibrium,
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1. consumers search efficiently from the faster store to the slower store and
2. firms have a clear prominence order, which is based on intrafirm frictions.
4.2 Unique equilibrium between Diamond and Bertrand
By Lemma 3, any equilibrium where firms use pure strategies for frictions must have a
faster, prominent firm and a slower, non-prominent firm. More specifically, all consumers
start from the faster firm i = 1 and switch to the slower firm i = 2 only when they
find the price p1; the slower firm attracts no captives, B2 = 0. By Lemma 2, the profits
of the prominent firm and the non-prominent firm are hence given by Π1 = B1 and
Π2 = (1 − p)B1 = (1 − α)B1 = B1B1,2/(B1 + B1,2). We next describe one by one both
firms’ best responses in frictions.
4.2.1 Prominent firm’s problem
The prominent firm maximizes the following expression:
max
θ1
B1(θ) = max
θ1
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1)
Its profit is given by the number of uninformed consumers B1, who are its captives. As
consumers switch the store once they find a price, the prominent firm has a tradeoff be-
tween maximizing the number of consumers who find its price (by decreasing its frictions,
it increases the inflow from consumer group B0 to group B1) and minimizing the number
of consumers who find the other firm’ price (by increasing its frictions, it decreases the
outflow from consumer group B1 to group B1,2).
Note particularly that the factor
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1) is the efficiency gain, the difference in
the number of trades 1− e−θ1 − 1 + e−θ2 , that the prominent firm generates by serving its
consumers faster than its competitor. However, although this tends to align the prominent
firm’s private benefits with social benefits, the factor θ
1
θ1−θ2 , that governs the turnover rate
from B1 to B1,2, is decreasing in θ
1 because faster service means that more consumers
have time to find also its competitor’s price.
Due to these tradeoffs that the prominent firm has, it is optimal for it to generate
intermediate frictions, θ1 ∈ (0,∞). Unfortunately, this implies that the number of trades
is suboptimal.
Proposition 3 There exists no efficient equilibrium, where the prominent firm gener-
ates no frictions.
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To emphasize, the intuition for this is that, since the prominent firm cannot reap (bear)
the full positive (negative) externality that faster (slower) search has on the consumers,
it has no incentive to serve instantaneously every consumer. Thus, a positive welfare loss
is always created: search is efficient but service is inefficient.
Though consumers are free to switch the store at any point, we know that in equilib-
rium they do so only after they have found a price. This entails that the rate at which
price information arrives in a store plays also the role of an implicit (endogenous) switch-
ing cost. This switching cost benefits the prominent firm, and it has thus no incentive to
eliminate it completely.
As the consumers have deadlines, they have more time to discover the other price if
the first one is found early on. That intensifies price competition. Therefore, although one
store could serve the entire market if it chose to decrease its frictions, it has no incentive
to do so because that would also strengthen competition.
4.2.2 Non-prominent firm’s problem
The non-prominent firm maximizes the following expression:
max
θ2
B1(θ)B1,2(θ)
B1(θ) +B1,2(θ)
= max
θ2
θ1
θ1−θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1) (1− e−θ1 − θ1
θ1−θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1))
1− e−θ1 ,
or, equivalently, the product of the other firm’s captives and shoppers
max
θ2
B1(θ)B1,2(θ) = max
θ2
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1)(1− e−θ1 − θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1)) .
This formulation demonstrates that the non-prominent firm has an incentive to equal-
ize the numbers of informed consumers and uninformed consumers. Its demand is coming
only from shoppers but due to their intensifying effect on competition it wins them over
more frequently if the prominent firm has more captives, which makes it raise the price.
The non-prominent firm has thus mixed incentives in choosing the frictions: if it ele-
vates θ2, the number of informed consumers goes up (its has more potential demand) but,
then, the number of uninformed consumers goes down (competition becomes stronger).
This clear tradeoff makes it profitable to apply an interior level of search frictions, θ2.
Proposition 4 There are equally many informed consumers and uninformed consumers
in an equilibrium.
When the prominence order is clear, the non-prominent firm’s choice θ2 only affects
the division of consumers between the informed segment, B1,2, and the uninformed seg-
ment, B1 (how many find two prices), but it has no bearing on welfare, 1 − B0, which
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depends instead on the prominent firm’s choice θ1 (how many find one price). The non-
prominent firm has thus an incentive to make sure that the outcome is exactly in between
Diamond equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium, as measured by the relative numbers of
informed consumers B1
B1+B1,2
= p and uninformed consumers B1,2
B1+B1,2
= 1 − p but it does
not care about efficiency. Nevertheless, its choices affect also welfare because, to split
the consumers into two equally large segments, B1 and B1,2, the non-prominent firm has
to apply so high frictions that the prominent firm can keep its frictions quite low while
maintaining a substantial captive demand.
The prominent firm’s frictions are strategic substitutes to non-prominent firm’s fric-
tions and the opposite holds true as well. We verify in Appendix that the maximizer of
the prominent firm’s problem θ1(θ2)? is decreasing in θ2 and the maximizer of the non-
prominent firm’s problem θ2(θ1)? is decreasing in θ1. Lower information frictions in one
store can compensate for higher information frictions in the other store in the optimal
management of consumer information. Interestingly, after imposing the equal split of
consumers into captives B1 and shoppers B1,2, it turns out that the welfare loss that is
generated by the prominent firm’s optimally chosen frictions is approximately 6%. The
atom size and the lowest price must equal one half α = p = 1/2, which is later reflected in
the surplus sharing in proportions 2:1:1 for the prominent firm, the non-prominent firm
and the consumers, respectively.
4.2.3 Fixed point in intrafirm frictions
The firms’ reaction curves for intrafirm frictions are presented by Figures 4 and 5. They
jump down at θ−i ≈ 2.33 from θi ≈ 2.33 to θi ≈ 1.08 and they cross each other at
(θ1, θ2)
? ≈ (2.76, 1.03) when θ1 ≥ θ2 (the assumed case) and at (θ1, θ2)? ≈ (1.03, 2.76)
when θ2 ≥ θ1 (the inverse case). To secure a prominent market position, the firm must
thus have a service rate higher than 2.33, which renders it optimal for its competitor to
use a service rate lower than 1.08. This puts a lower bound on the non-prominent firm’s
frictions and an upper bound on the prominent firm’s frictions: the number of trades
must exceed 1− e−2.33 in equilibrium.
Observe that, while it might look so in Figures 4 and 5, there is no overlap on the
diagonal for the (approximative) value range θi ∈ (2.0, 2.33) because for that range the
best response is always a higher rate.32 This pins down our two equilibrium points and
shows that there exists a unique cutoff level for frictions θ′ ≈ 2.33 such that: if the other
firm if slower than the cutoff, θ−i < θ′, firm i’s best response is to become the prominent
firm, i.e., BRi(θ
−i) > θ−i, whereas, if the other firm is faster than the cutoff, θ−i > θ′,
firm i’s best response is to become the non-prominent firm, i.e., BRi(θ
−i) < θ−i. We
prove our next main result in Appendix.
32E.g., BRi(2.00) = 2.00 + , where  > 0 is a small number.
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Proposition 5 Assume without loss of generality that θ1 ≥ θ2. Then, there exists a
unique equilibrium where θ? ≈ (2.76, 1.03).
Figure 4: Best response functions for two firms: zoom-in.
Corollary 4 The equilibrium has the following properties:
1. Frictions: there is a prominent firm who sets frictions θ1 ≈ 2.76 and a non-
prominent firm who sets frictions θ2 ≈ 1.03. Before a price is found, the expected
wait time in the former is about 36% of the total time and the expected wait time in
the latter is about 97% of the total time. Note that these times can be regarded as
endogenous search costs or switching costs.
2. Search: The consumers search in the prominent firm until they find their first price
quote, s1 = 1 and s2 = 0. As a result, 47 per cent of the consumers find both prices,
B1,2 ≈ 0.47, and 47 per cent of the consumers find a price from the prominent firm
but not from the non-prominent firm, B1 ≈ 0.47; 6 per cent of the consumers fail
to find any price, B0 ≈ 0.06.
3. Prices: The prominent firm offers the monopoly price (p = 1) and a random discount
price (p < 1) equally often, α = 0.5; the non-prominent firm always offers a random
discount price. Given that a firm offers a discount, the expected discount size is 31
per cent of the monopoly price at either firm; the largest such regularly used discount
is 50 per cent, p = 0.5.
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Figure 5: Best response functions for two firms: zoom-out.
4. Surplus sharing: The prominent firm is earning the double of what the non-prominent
firm is earning, Π1 = B1 ≈ 0.47,Π2 = αB1,2 ≈ 0.5 · 0.47. The prominent firm ob-
tains half the surplus, the non-prominent firm obtains a quarter and the consumers
receive a quarter; 6 per cent of the cake is wasted.
Corollary 4 can be proved as an elementary calculation that uses the previous finding
θ ≈ (2.76, 1.03) and the expressions we derived earlier for Bi(θ), B1,2(θ), B0(θ), E [p1]
and E [p2].
It is important to observe that the same robust friction pattern is the unique pure
equilibrium even if we lengthen or shorten the deadline. In other words, the outcome is
just the same in terms of search, prices, and profit whether the consumers can search for a
decade or a minute, as long as the setup is still fitting with our basic model. Particularly,
for all choices of consumer deadline, two firms have still an incentive to synchronize
their respective frictions such that the numbers of informed consumers and uninformed
consumers are kept the same.
Remark 3 An identical equilibrium outcome arises whatever the deadline q <∞ is as
long as it is finite: if (θ1, θ2) is an equilibrium when the search horizon is t ∈ [0, 1], then
( θ
1
q
, θ
2
q
) is an equilibrium when the search horizon is t ∈ [0, q].
Observe, however, that Bertrand equilibrium would become the unique equilibrium
if the deadline was infinity whereas multiple equilibria, including Diamond equilibrium,
would arise if the deadline was zero. This again emphasizes the role of deadlines in
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escaping the paradoxes by Bertrand and Diamond.
Remark 4 There is a discontinuity in the equilibrium set both at q =∞ and at q = 0
because a unique equilibrium arises for any q ∈ (0,∞) but, if q =∞, Bertrand equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium (consumers find all prices) and, if q = 0, any arbitrary prices
constitute an equilibrium when (consumers find no prices).
To summarize, the set of equilibria is invariant to finite translations in the deadline,
which is also the only exogenous parameter in our model so far.33 Bertrand equilibrium
is possible only if the consumers are extremely patient and Diamond equilibrium only if
the consumers are extremely impatient. Otherwise, duopoly outcome must lie precisely
between these extremes in the sense that there must be exactly equally many informed
and uninformed consumers.
5 Generalized modeling approach
Although our framework of time cost, strategic complexity and consumer deadlines has
several attractive features, some of the findings might perhaps seem overly specific. More-
over, despite the fact that we could solve the base line case with two firms using the Poisson
process, its high degree of detail makes it quite cumbersome to work with in extensions.
To offer a more tractable framework for applications, this section retains only the main
features of our previous approach and generalizes it in important ways.
We are interested especially in the interplay of price obfuscation and price advertizing,
which apparently serve the opposite functions in controlling price information: obfuscation
restricts and advertizing extends the availability of information in the market. Despite
this interest, it is not clear from the start how a firm’s obfuscation depends on the firm’s
advertizing as a part of its marketing mix. To consider their joint effects in a simple basic
model, we thus make the following assumptions about consumer search:
• Clear prominence order: All consumers who search for information find the promi-
nent firm’s price, p1, before the non-prominent firm’s price, p2. The prominence
order is exogenously given in this case and could be based on, say, relative obfusca-
tion or relative advertizing.
• Partition of consumers: The set of consumers is partitioned into two sets, A+B = 1,
where A represents consumers who receive their price information (exogenously)
from advertizing and B represents consumers who obtain their price information
(endogenously) from searching.
• Continuity: B0, B1 and B1,2 are continuous in (θ1, θ2) and sum to 1− A.
33We do make the distribution assumption that the wait time before a price is found in a store is
exponential Exp(θi) and price information thus arrives at Poisson rate θi.
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• Inefficiency: B0(0, θ2) = 1− A and B0(θ1, θ2)→ 0 as θ1 →∞ for all θ2.
• Uninformed consumers: B1(θ1, 0) = 1− A− B0 and B1(θ1, θ2) → 0 as θ2 → ∞ for
all θ1 ∈ (0,∞).
• Informed consumers: B1,2(θ1, 0) = 0 and B1,2(θ1, θ2) → 1 − A − B0 as θ2 → ∞ for
all θ1 ∈ (0,∞).
• Unique continuous best response in θ1: there exists a unique θ1(θ2)? =
arg maxθ1 B1, which is continuous and decreasing in θ
2; θ1(θ2)? → ∞ as θ2 → 0
and θ1(θ2)? → θ1 ∈ (0,∞) as θ2 →∞.34
• Strategic substitutes: B1 is decreasing in θ2 and B1,2 is increasing in θ2; B0 is
unaffected by θ2.
• Unique continuous best response in θ2: there exists a unique θ2(θ1)? =
arg maxθ2
(A1+B1−A2)(A1,2+B1,2)
A1+A1,2+B1+B1,2
for all θ1, A1, A2 and A1,2; θ
2(θ1)? → ∞ as θ1 → 0
and θ2(θ1)? → θ2 ∈ (0,∞) as θ1 →∞.35
Note that the game has continuous best responses that cross at least once: an equi-
librium always exists with exogenous prominence order. The introduction of exogenous
information thus not only reconciles our model with the fact that some consumers have
access to alternative information sources but it also serves the purpose of getting rid of
the inconvenient discontinuity in the best response functions of obfuscation as depicted
by Figures 4 and 5. We can thereby easily proceed to analyze the comparative statics of
obfuscation for different levels of advertizing in a given equilibrium. We need not make a
claim about the uniqueness of equilibrium obfuscation strategies.
5.1 Obfuscation and advertizing with two firms
Consider a market where firms serve two consumer segments: One consumer segment (e.g.,
oﬄine-customers) has already received sufficient price information to complete the pur-
chase. This could stem either from advertizing or other forms of pre-existing connections
between firms and their customers. The other consumer segment (e.g., online-customers)
is still in doubt and is not willing to purchase before receiving more information.
Both segments include consumers who buy for p1 (A1 and B1), consumers who buy
for p2 (A2 and B2) and consumers who buy for the lowest of p1 and p2 (A1,2 and B1,2).
We can regard A1 and A2 as measures of customer loyalty and A1,2 as a measure of direct
34In our Poisson setting, the best response to zero frictions, θ−i = ∞, was found to be θi = ln(2)
whereas the best response to infinite frictions, θ−i = 0, would be monopoly frictions θi =∞.
35If the prominent firm is extremely slow, the non-prominent firm has to be extremely fast, to guarantee
that equally many consumers have time to discover one price and two prices by the deadline.
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exposure to price comparison in the market.36 Advertizing A may have both informative
and persuasive features: we assume it removes incentives to find more information.
The main insights from our model can be captured by analyzing four distinct cases:
total advertizing level, A = A1 +A2 +A1,2, is fixed but (i) the prominent firm intensifies
its advertizing to the other firm’s consumers, dA1 = −dA1,2 > 0, (ii) the prominent firm’s
advertizing attracts additional captives from the non-prominent firm, dA1 = −dA2 > 0,
and (iii) the non-prominent firm intensifies its advertizing to the other firm’s consumers,
dA2 = −dA1,2 > 0, or (iv) the prominent firm advertizes more so that the total advertizing
level is increased, dA = dA1 > 0. All other cases can be obtained by combining these four
cases.
Note first that advertizing has no direct effects on the prominent firm’s obfuscation,
which is chosen so as to maximize the sum of its oﬄine captives, A1, and its online captives,
B1. Only the latter number is responsive to obfuscation, the former one is a parameter.
This maintains the prominent firm’s obfuscation problem independent of advertizing.
max
θ1
A1 +B1 = max
θ1
B1.
Any effect that advertizing might have on the prominent firm’s obfuscation must thus
come indirectly via the non-prominent firm’s obfuscation. The non-prominent firm’s ob-
fuscation problem is indeed slightly different now. The additional potential demand from
the informed consumers A1,2 +B1,2 is determined jointly by advertizing and obfuscation.
max
θ2
A2 + α(A1,2 +B1,2) = max
θ2
(A1 +B1 − A2)(A1,2 +B1,2)
A1 + A1,2 +B1 +B1,2
.
Also the atom α is a bit different now: stronger advertizing asymmetry (higher A1−A2)
increases the atom and overlapping price advertizing (higher A1,2) decreases the atom.
Now, for any given level of prominent firm’s obfuscation, the change in B1 is the
negative of the change in B1,2. As a result, interior optimum is found at the level where
A1 +B1 − A2 = A1,2 +B1,2 (11)
where the lhs is higher when the prominent firm has more captives (this effect comes
through higher p: price competition is then less intensive at the low end of the price
distribution) and the rhs is higher when the non-prominent firm has higher potential
demand from informed consumers (this effect comes through higher α: price competition
is then more intensive at the high end of the price distribution).
By the same logic as earlier in this paper, the non-prominent firm’s obfuscation decision
can balance Equation 11 by accelerating or decelerating the rate at which uninformed
consumers B1 are transformed into informed consumers B1,2. Assuming that advertizing
36Like the availability of an extensive price comparison site.
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parameters A1, A2 and A1,2 are set before obfuscation levels are chosen, we obtain the
following comparative statics of advertizing on obfuscation:
Proposition 6 Start from a case where advertizing A = A1 + A2 + A1,2 is fixed
and consider the effects of a marginal or rather small change  > 0 in advertizing
on equilibrium obfuscation.
1. Suppose the non-prominent firm targets less (informative) advertizing to the other
firm’s captives: A is fixed and dA1 = −dA1,2 =  > 0. Then, A1 + B1 = A2 +
A1,2 + B1,2 − 2 in the new equilibrium, which means that the non-prominent firm
decreases its obfuscation and the prominent firm increases its obfuscation; the new
equilibrium is less efficient than the old one because B0 is higher.
2. Suppose the prominent firm targets less (informative) advertizing to the other firm’s
captives: A is fixed and dA2 = −dA1,2 =  > 0. Then, A1 + B1 = A2 + A1,2 + B1,2
in the new equilibrium, which means that nothing changes.
3. Suppose the prominent firm targets more (persuasive) advertizing to the other firm’s
captives: A is fixed and dA1 = −dA2 =  > 0. Then, A1 +B1 = A2 +A1,2 +B1,2 −
2 in the new equilibrium, which means that the non-prominent firm decreases its
obfuscation and the prominent firm increases its obfuscation; the new equilibrium is
less efficient than the old one because B0 is higher.
4. Suppose the prominent firm targets more advertizing to previously uninformed con-
sumers: A is higher by the change in A1 such that dA = dA1 =  > 0 but A2 and A1,2
stay the same. Then, A1 +B1 = A2 +A1,2 +B1,2 −  in the new equilibrium, which
means that the non-prominent firm decreases its obfuscation and the prominent firm
increases its obfuscation; the new equilibrium could be more or less efficient than
the old one because B0 could be higher or lower.
This rich set of predictions on advertizing and obfuscation might be empirically testable
with appropriate data. Our general result is that the non-prominent firm’s obfuscation
adjusts to equalize the maximal demands that the prominent firm and the non-prominent
firm may have at the monopoly price: respectively, A1 +B1 and A2 +A1,2 +B1,2. Again
equilibrium forces thus pin down the relative numbers of informed consumers and unin-
formed consumers. As in our basic model, when only the prominent firm has captives,
the numbers of informed consumers and uninformed consumers are identical. Otherwise,
the number of informed consumers is equal to the difference between the prominent firm
and the non-prominent firm’s captives.
Advertizing by the prominent firm has the same effect whether it is informative (turns
captives A2 into informed A1,2) or persuasive (turns captives A2 into captives A1) whereas
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informative advertizing by the non-prominent firm has no effect on equilibrium obfusca-
tion. If the prominent firm releases more information through advertizing it has less of the
need to facilitate independent information acquisition by consumers themselves because
the non-prominent firm responds to its additional advertizing by putting more effort into
helping consumers. Advertizing and obfuscation must thus be strategic complements for
the prominent firm when obfuscation by the prominent firm is a strategic substitute to
obfuscation by the non-prominent firm.
Our findings are illustrated by Figure 6. It shows an equilibrium as a crossing point
between the prominent firm and the non-prominent firm’s best response functions. The
former stays fixed throughout. The latter shifts to the right if A1 increases and to the left
if A2 +A1,2 increases. To put it differently, narrow price awareness (higher A1) results in
more obfuscation by the prominent firm as the fixed point shifts down and to the right,
whereas, general price awareness (higher A1,2 or higher A2) results in less obfuscation by
the prominent firm as the fixed point moves up and to the left.
Figure 6: Best response functions with narrow and general price awareness.
5.2 Obfuscation and advertizing with three firms
To illustrate how our setting extends to larger markets, we turn to consider a three firm
setup with exogenous advertizing and endogenous obfuscation. The assumption that the
market has an exogenously given prominence order is maintained: most consumers start
searching from the 1st prominent firm i = 1 and then move to the 2nd prominent firm
i = 2 and to the 3rd prominent firm i = 3. To be specific, we introduce the following
asymmetry constraint on the consumer partition
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B1 > B2 ≥ B3, B1,2 ≥ B1,3 > B3,2.
As before, consumers are partitioned into two sets, A+B = 1, where consumers A are
willing to purchase without searching whereas consumers B are not. With more prices in
the market, the information partition of consumers must clearly be more refined now:
A = A1 + A2 + A3 + A1,2 + A2,3 + A1,3 + A1,2,3,
B = B0 +B1 +B2 +B3 +B1,2 +B2,3 +B1,3 +B1,2,3.
For instance, consumers A1,3 and B1,3 purchase for the lowest of prices p1 and p3. As each
of these consumer groups behaves alike, we denote by Ci the sum Ai+Bi for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Similarly, Ci,j denotes Ai,j +Bi,j, for all i, j = 1, 2, 3, and C1,2,3 denotes A1,2,3 +B1,2,3.
C = C0 + C1 + C2 + C3 + C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,3 + C1,2,3 = 1.
Our model extends quite substantially the symmetric information structures in the
literature: for example, in the basic Stahl model with three firms, C1 = C2 = C3 =
1−µ
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and C1,2,3 = µ. The model has a unique symmetric equilibrium with two firms but Baye et
al. (1992) show that a continuum of asymmetric randomized equilibria arises with more
than two firms. The literature has not yet provided a characterization of equilibrium
pricing strategies for any general information partition of consumers C. We find that
introducing asymmetry and partition completeness strictly refines the set of equilibria in
the basic Stahl model with three firms.
Proposition 7 Assume a weak ordering for market prominence C1 > C2 ≥ C3, C1,2 ≥
C1,3 > C3,2 and a complete information partition: Ci > 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3, Ci,j > 0 for
all i, j = 1, 2, 3 and C1,2,3 > 0. There exists a price equilibrium where the profits are
Π1 = C1 >
Π2 = C2 + αC1,2 >
Π3 = C3 + αC1,3
The 1st and the 3rd prominent firms choose their prices randomly from price distribu-
tions with interval support
[
p, 1
]
whereas the 2nd prominent firm uses the interval support
[p′, 1], where p′ > p. The 1st prominent firm has an atom of size α at the price of one
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p =
C1
C1 + (C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3)
,
α =
C3 + (C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
C1 + (C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3)
C1
C1,3
− C3
C1,3
.
If we assume instead a strict ordering for market prominence, C2 = C3 = C2,3 = 0,
but otherwise maintain our assumptions, the equilibrium price distributions are unique.
Note particularly that Proposition 7 replaces the continuum of asymmetric equilibria
with differently sized atoms in Baye et al. (1992) by either a unique or a finite number of
asymmetric equilibria because here only one firm can hold an atom in its price distribution.
This leaves us with a finite number of candidate equilibria, where different firms may
have the atom. If two firms had an atom at the same time, this would create a profitable
deviation to either of them. For example, if the 2nd prominent firm had a mass point
at unity, then the 1st prominent firm would gain B1,2 by deviating from its mass point
p1 = 1 to a slightly smaller price p1 = 1 − . This shows that the continuum result is
special to the symmetric model in in Baye et al. (1992) and not robust to perturbations
in information endowments. The authors construct a metagame to eliminate asymmetric
equilibria. Our result brings them back – with either uniqueness or finiteness.
Both of our new assumptions, strict prominence order (asymmetric numbers of unin-
formed consumers, C1 > C2 = C3 = 0 and C1,2 ≥ C1,3 > C2,3) and complete information
partition (presence of partially informed consumers C1,2 > 0 and C1,3 > 0), play an im-
portant role here. For example, in Example 2 in Baye et al. (1992) where the number of
firms is n > 2, k > 2 firms mix over an interval support and the rest n − k load all the
probability mass at one. Consumers are either fully uninformed (know about one price)
or fully informed (know all the prices). As a result, none of the mass point firms has an
incentive to undercut the price of another such firm because its demand does not jump
up unless it wins over all its competitors. By contrast, in our case with a complete in-
formation partition, beating one competitor is sufficient to gain a jump in demand. This
implies that only one firm, the prominent one, can have an atom at the high end of the
price distribution, which elevates the profits of all the other non-prominent firms in the
market. The other firms must in a sense realize the benefit from undercutting the atom
via their equilibrium pricing behavior already.
In Example 3 in Baye et al. (1992), the atom size can be continuously adjusted but
all firms still obtain the same equilibrium profit. This is not possible in our asymmetric
equilibria due to the subtle forces that govern mixing behavior when firms earn unequal
profits. Here the profits that firms make in equilibrium order the firms (partially or
completely) in a strict profit ranking. The higher the profit of a firm, the higher the lowest
price that the firm is willing to offer in order to capture all the informed consumers in
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the market. However, to support optimal mixing, at least two firms must be randomizing
their prices in the neighborhood of the lowest price and, to avoid incentives to use it
excessively, they must have a shared lowest price. To meet all the requirements, one of
the higher profit firms must have an atom at unity to increase the lowest profit to the
right level, where both firms’ price distributions vanish at the same lowest prices.
A unique equilibrium arises in a market with strict prominence order because only
the prominent firm has captives then. It is therefore the only firm who can have an atom
α in its equilibrium price distribution and, in doing so, both (i) retain its own positive
equilibrium profits (C1) and (ii) provide positive profits to the other firms (αC1,2 and
αC1,3).
We are now ready to study briefly the effects of competition. We continue to assume a
strict exogenous prominence order: all searching consumers start from the 1st prominent
firm and, then, a fraction s2 > 0 of them searches from the 2nd to the 3rd prominent
firm and a fraction s3 = 1 − s2 > 0 from the 3rd to the 2nd prominent firm, i.e., B1 >
B2 = B3 = 0, B1,2 ≥ B1,3 > B2,3 = 0.37 According to Proposition 7, under the reasonable
assumption that the 2nd and 3rd prominent firms cannot target advertizing to separate
captive consumer segments, i.e., A2 = A3 = 0, a unique equilibrium price distribution
arises. We also introduce the following assumptions for combined effects of obfuscation
by the non-prominent firms. They are motivated by the insights from our basic Poisson
model. We maintain our previous assumptions about the prominent firm’s obfuscation
with obvious relevant changes.
Assumption 1 ∂C1(s
i)
∂θi
< 0 = ∂C1(s
i)
∂θj
and ∂C1,2,3(s
i)
∂θj
= ∂C1,2,3(s
j)
∂θj
> 0 for all i, j = 2, 3
and i 6= j.
Technically, Assumption 1 entails that partially informed consumers C1,i respond to
the ith prominent firm’s frictions much like uninformed consumers C1 respond to the
1st prominent firm’s frictions: the numbers of consumers who find two prices are non-
monotone in the non-prominent firm’s obfuscation while the numbers of consumers who
find one price are non-monotone in the prominent firm’s obfuscation. The idea is that
θ2 and θ3 both decrease C1 and increase C1,2,3 by making the second and the third price
quote easier to discover. As a result, a lower level of obfuscation by the non-prominent
firms’ first increases B1,2 and B1,3 because more consumers become informed about their
prices (they move from, say, B1 to B1,2) and then decreases them because more consumers
find also the remaining third price (which moves them, say, B1, 2 to B1,2,3).
Following Proposition 7, the 1st prominent firm’s obfuscation problem can again be
written as
37Note that competition is likely to reduce obfuscation more if the non-prominent firms must compete
over their relative positions after the prominent firm. We do not study that here because also exogenous
factors (e.g., the prominence order suggested by the search engine listing) strongly affect the order in
which consumers search the non-prominent firms.
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max
θ1
C1 = max
θ1
B1.
Instead, the 2nd and the 3rd prominent firms’ obfuscation decisions are determined
respectively by
max
θ2
C2 + αC1,2 = max
θ2
C1(C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
C1 + C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3
C1,2
C1,3
,
max
θ3
C3 + αC1,3 = max
θ3
C1(C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
C1 + C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3
.
The firms’ problems show that a market with three firms differs from a market with
two firms in important respects. Consider more closely a non-prominent firm i = 3 whose
price is p3 < 1 (the analysis is identical for p2 < 1). This firm no longer obtains the entire
residual demand 1 − C0 − C1 either when p3 = p or when p1 = 1. First, if p3 = p, the
non-prominent firm only gets C1,3 + C1,2,3 but not C1,2 because these partially informed
consumers have not seen its price yet.38 Second, if p1 = 1, the non-prominent firm only
gets C1,3 but not C1,2 nor C1,2,3 because the other non-prominent firm has a lower price
with probability one. This is also reflected in the atom size α necessary to keep the firm
randomizing in the appropriate way.
Because this atom α synchronizes the incentives of the 1st prominent firm with the 3rd
prominent firm – not with the 2nd prominent firm, the incentives of the non-prominent
firms usually differ: both of these firms i maximize C1(C1,3 + C1,2,3)
C1,i
C1,3
, which captures
their selling probability and their demands for the highest price, but for different numbers
of ”secondary captives”, C1,2 and C1,3.
Additionally, since the firms have different positions on the consumers’ path, the
ability to affect certain groups of consumers is different for the 2nd and 3rd prominent
firms. Lower frictions in the 2nd prominent firm decrease C1 and C1,3 but increase C1,2,3
whereas lower frictions in the 3rd prominent firm decrease C1 and increase C1,3 + C1,2,3.
The demand from informed consumers is thus relatively more elastic for the 3rd prominent
firm than for the 2nd prominent firm.
In isolation, the effect has a tendency to make the 2nd prominent firm prefer higher
frictions than the 3rd prominent firm to relax price competition from the 1st prominent
firm more. Nevertheless, because the frictions of the 2nd prominent firm initially increase
and then decrease C1,2 but always reduce C1,3, there is a counterbalancing effect from its
more prominent standing in the market.
Optimal behavior of the 3rd prominent firm pins down the level of price competition
α and the relative numbers of uninformed consumers and fully and partially informed
38Generally, the same is true also for the prominent firm, which raises the lowest price p from
C1
C1+C1,2+C1,3+C2,3+C1,2,3
to C1C1+C1,2+C1,3+C1,2,3 .
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consumers.
Proposition 8 Consider a market with three firms where C2 = C3 = C2,3 = 0. Any
equilibrium must feature more informed consumers than uninformed consumers. In par-
ticular, C1 = γ
3 (C1,3 + C1,2,3) < C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3 where γ
3 < 1.
In equilibrium, the 1st prominent firm maximizes C1 and the 3rd prominent firm
maximizes αC1 whereas the 2nd prominent firm has a service rate that is higher than
the maximizer of maxθ2
C1,2
C1,2
but lower than the maximizer or maxθ2 αC1. The frictions
of the 2nd prominent firm are thus lower than the 3rd prominent firm prefers in order
to maximize its own objective. Nevertheless, we cannot tell from this alone which of the
non-prominent firms obfuscates less and we cannot therefore determine for any s2 = 1−s3
whether the prominent firm increases its obfuscation. Notwithstanding, the key result of
Proposition 8, that there are more fully and partially informed consumers than uninformed
consumers, arises under relatively weak assumptions. If we want to have stronger results,
we need to strengthen our assumptions; this lies beyond the scope of the paper.
5.3 Applications to politics, innovation, and lobbying
So far we have studied the effects of obfuscation in a price competition setup. This
is not the only application where obfuscation-like behavior might arise. As discussed
in Baye et al. (1996), the structure of randomized equilibria is essentially identical in
an oligopolistic price competition model like Varian (1980) and in all-pay auctions and
contests, with applications to promotions, principal-agent-problems etc. We give next
some examples of how our model could be rephrased to consider more generally the
effects of organizational frictions and institutional complexity.
The simplest way to do so is to consider an all-pay auction, where two players i compete
for a prize of value W (c) in a first price sealed bid, all-pay auction by submitting bids xi.
The player who submits the highest bid wins the prize. The players have heterogeneous
outside options W i(c), where W −W i > W i > 0 and W 1 > W 2 and c represents strategic
complexity or ”frictions”, that we soon specify. As demonstrated by Baye et al. (1996),
the players randomize their bids over an interval support [0, x¯], possibly with an atom at
zero, which leads to a familiar equilibrium structure.
Bidding the highest value xi = x¯ yields the prize net of the outside option W −W i
for both players whereas bidding the lowest value xi = 0 yields W
1 for player i = 1 and
W 2 + α(W − 2W 2) for player i = 2, where α denotes the probability of bidding zero for
player i = 1. By similar methods as before (i.e., payoff comparisons at xi = 0 and xi = x¯),
we find that x¯ = W − 2W 1 and α = 1− W−2W 1
W−2W 2 . Thus, the value of this game for player
i = 1 is W 1 and that for player i = 2 is W 2 + α(W − 2W 2) = 2W 1 −W 2. The player’s
incentives are thereby strongly aligned in that both benefit from an increase in W 1 because
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it alleviates competition. The value of the prize dissipates in the bidding process. Bidding
effort distributions G1(x) = x+W
1−3W 2
W−2W 2 = α +
x−(W 1+W 2)
W−2W 1 > G
2(x) = x
W−2W 1 increase in
the sense of first order stochastic dominance in (W,W 2,−W 1) (for player i = 1) and in
(W,−W 1) (for player i = 2). We also assume that W 1 > 1 + 3W 2 + (W−W 2)2
W−W 1 (strong
enough asymmetry to support equilibrium behavior and relatively attractive prize to order
the bid distributions).
Example 1 (politics and legislative complexity) Consider a contest between a new
party i = 1 (wants to change the law) and an old party i = 2 (prefers the status quo). The
complexity of legislation c determines how large a part of value W is burned in rewriting
the law. To obtain a simple model, we can here set W 1 = c (the saved legislative costs) and
W 2 = 0. Additional complexity has several notable effects: (i) it discourages legislative
efforts in general by increasing W 1, (ii) it increases the likelihood of effortless win, α, for
the old party, and (iii) it raises the value of the game by W 1, also for the old party.
Example 2 (innovation and regulatory complexity) Consider a research and product
development contest: the incumbent firm i = 1 has a higher outside option than the
entrant firm i = 2, W 1 > W 2. Regulatory complexity in patenting and marketing (the
risk of hold-up, litigation, etc.) is given by c and it reduces the value of winning, W (c).
Complexity thus decreases the research efforts of both the incumbent and the entrant.
However, because the negative effect on G1(x) is higher than the negative effect on G2(x)
for any x, additional complexity reduces innovation effort more by the incumbent than by
the entrant.39
It is easy to see how in a suitable (possibly repeated) metagame the old party might
instate a positive level of legislative complexity to deter entry or a consumer protection
authority and the entrant might together push for more regulatory complexity. We give
one more example from lobbying:
Example 3 (lobbying and the revolving door) Consider a contest between two lobbyists
i = 1 (right-lobby) and i = 2 (left-lobby) with a revolving door to politics, business, now-
profits, etc. The rates of the their revolving doors are given, respectively, by θ1 (right
wing lobbyist goes to private sector) and θ2 (left wing lobbyist goes to public sector). The
outside options are W i(θi), where a lower rate θi reduce the outside options. We assume
that frictions are lower for the right-wing lobby than for the left wing lobby: W 1 > W 2.
Now, lower frictions for the right wing lobby reduce all lobbying by raising W 1, yet, lower
frictions for the left wing increase right wing lobbying by raising W 2.
In addition to their independent value, these examples serve also to show the limits
of our exact halfway result, which now fails to arise even though we have seen that it
appears in various price competition specifications. The apparent reason for this is that,
39The effect can be ambiguous if the value of the prize is small.
37
in the all-pay auctions we consider, the player’s net value is a linear function of choice
variable but, in a price competition model, the firm’s price has a multiplicative effect on
profit. We find that the players’ incentives are even more strongly aligned here than in
our price competition model. Therefore, both players may rationally advocate complexity
even if it elevates only the higher outside option.
6 Concluding discussion
We introduce a new price search model that features endogenous frictions, modeled by
the gradual arrival of price information within stores. Intrafirm frictions could refer,
for the consumer’s part, to the time cost of stochastic cognitive processes involved in
understanding price information on an online firm’s website. For the firm’s part, frictions
could represent its long-term investment in a particular search technology inside its store,
strategic complexity.
Assuming that consumers are committed to search until their deadlines, we show
that there exists a natural level of competition intensity and distribution of consumer
information, which could arise from a mix of obfuscation and advertizing. Welfare effects
of this optimal control of information are minor but the effects on surplus sharing are
dramatic. Wider price awareness and advertizing restrict obfuscation by the prominent
firm, whose choices matter the most.
If the prominence order in the market is stable, equilibrium forces push toward the
same ultimate information outcome, in which there are equally many uninformed con-
sumers (who find only the first store’s price) and informed consumers (who find also the
second firm’s price) at the time when purchase decisions are made. This apparently ro-
bust result is shown to be (i) independent of the deadline length or the search horizon,
(ii) invariant to slight changes in the prior distribution of consumers’ information and
(iii) almost immune to additional competition, which pushes the balance towards more
information.40 Empirical research could perhaps test the finding for shorter and longer
search tasks, across older and newer markets with different levels of pre-existing consumer
information, etc.
The motivating idea behind this paper has been to move the point of focus from
switching and traveling between stores onto what goes on inside stores and, thus, update
price search literature to the internet age. The task has prompted us to analyze more
closely the time costs of searching for information in a given store and their relation to store
complexity – an idea that has natural connections to exiting literature on obfuscation.
This exploration of micro foundations of obfuscation a` la Becker (1965), if you will, has
also led us to analyze more closely firms’ incentives to generate search frictions inside
40We specify in Section 5 how exactly the result may have to be modified with advertizing and
competition.
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their stores and the optimal consumer response in a setup where search is not a discrete
decision but a continuous process with positive duration.41
As an improvement over previous methods, doing so makes it possible to derive endoge-
nous consumer information and prices as (piecewise) continuous functions of intrafirm fric-
tions because the usual consumer hold-up problem in the first store no longer arises.42 The
problem has been a nuisance of most homogenous-product-and-homogenous-consumer se-
quential search models43 in channeling adjustment from extensive to intensive margin;
our model engages both margins. Luckily, the results arising from this different modeling
approach offer more precision over previous work but do not show any discrepancy.44 The
core ideas are easy to apply out of our model (e.g., by letting consumer partition involve
B0(θ) > 0, that is a function of some variable θ).
We have assumed that search order is either a fixed parameter that we vary or that
service frictions are common knowledge in the market. In practice, frictions are not
observed, of course, but consumers learn about them during search. This implies that, if
a price is not found before some cutoff point in time, the consumer has an incentive to
switch over to another firm and maybe come back later. Multi-armed bandit literature45
is then the appropriate modeling framework. We view our model as a necessary first step
towards this fuller analysis.
Our message to competition authorities is that the welfare reducing effects of obfusca-
tion could be quite limited but the effects on consumer surplus drastic. For a fixed level of
frictions, a tradeoff between consumer surplus and search efficiency arises and somewhat
random store choice is then the best for average consumer. As signs of efficiency in mar-
kets with strong prominence differences, regulators should concentrate on (i) low degree
of choice complexity in the prominent firm and (ii) easy availability of prior information
about competing firms.
41For an even more microfounded model, see Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2016), where firms have several product
variants in their store. Every product variant, that the consumer attends to, adds its own incremental
stochastic time cost on the consumer search process. Both of these papers start from the idea that
searching for products has positive time costs even if all the information necessary for making the purchase
is right in front of your nose.
42The familiar property of ”no costly consumer search in equilibrium” must still hold in our model
with homogenous consumers. Stahl (1996) shows that the assumption of costless search is necessary for
price variance.
43But see the example in Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) where costly searchers search sometimes twice.
44The extension to more than two firms, nevertheless, demonstrates that intermediate price information
is important because it determines the captive demand for those firms who occupy second prominent
market positions.
45See Keller et al. (2005) for example and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006) for a review of bandit
models.
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Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Search
Step 1: Optimal search
To start, note that a consumer can find either no prices, only firm i = 1’s price, only firm
i = 2’s price, or both prices. In the first case her payoff of course equals zero but in three latter
cases her payoffs can be denoted more shortly as follows
CS1 := 1− E [p1] , CS2 := 1− E [p2] , and CSmin := 1− E [pmin] .
It is clear that the probability of finding zero prices is minimized and the probability of
finding two prices maximized by searching in the faster store until a price is found. If the faster
store is also the cheaper one, it is also clearly optimal to start from there.
Now the only unresolved case is thus the one where the faster store has higher prices, i.e.,
where θ1 > θ2 and CS1 < CS2. This is also the relevant case here because, as we prove later,
in equilibrium this kind of tradeoff between frictions and prices arises.
Note that, as the consumers can switch freely any moment t, their continuation value Vt+dt
in equation (1) is the same whether the consumer is currently at firm i = 1 or at firm i = 2.
This implies that, to maximize the consumer value, Vt, the consumer should search in the store
who is offering the largest marginal descent in consumer value, V˙t:
argmaxiV
i
t = argminiV˙
i
t .
Now provided the consumer stays in store i during the next short time interval [t, t+ dt],
the time derivative of the consumer value can be written as follows:46
Vt+dt − V it
dt
= −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t−dt)(1− E [pi]− Vt+dt)
+ (1− e−θ−i(1−t−dt))(1− E [pmin]− Vt+dt)
)
→
V˙ it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(E [pmin]− E
[
pi
]
) + (1− E [pmin]− Vt)
)
.
Obviously, the consumer value is positive, V it ≥ 0, and the change in consumer value is
negative, V˙ it ≤ 0, for any t and i. Otherwise, it would pay off to stay idle.
To sum up what we have, this entails that for any point in time t ∈ [0, 1] a consumer who
has not yet discovered a price chooses store i = 1 over store i = 2 iff
θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(CS1 − Vt) + θ1(1− e−θ2(1−t))(CSmin − Vt) ≥
θ2e−θ
1(1−t)(CS2 − Vt) + θ2(1− e−θ2(1−t))(CSmin − Vt), (12)
or, iff
46Observe that the time derivative is well defined as long as the consumer does not change the store
at t. Furthermore, even if the consumer does switch the store at t, as long as the consumer does not
switch stores infinitely often, we can still use these same expressions which then only refer to the right
derivative of consumer’s value. It is the right derivative that matters for search incentives.
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θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + θ1(CSmin − Vt) ≥
θ2e−θ
1(1−t)(CS2 − CSmin) + θ2(CSmin − Vt). (13)
Using these expressions, we proceed by showing that, if a consumer prefers one store over
the other at a given point in time, t′, this remains her preference order also later, for any t > t′,
if no price is found.
For the first case, suppose that a consumer prefers firm i = 1’s store over firm i = 2’s store
at time t. That would give us:
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt)
−θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) ≥ 0
and
V˙t = −θ1e−θ2(1−t)
(
CS1 − CSmin
)− θ1 (CSmin − Vt) .
To see now whether the consumer’s preference for store i = 1 over store i = 2 becomes
stronger or weaker over time, we differentiate (13) with respect to time to obtain
θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1V˙t
− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2V˙t
= θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)
+
(
θ1 − θ2) (θ1e−θ2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
+ θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)− θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)
= θ1
(
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
− θ1
(
θ2e−θ
1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt)) ≥ 0.
For the other case, suppose that a consumer prefers firm i = 2’s store over firm i = 1’s store
at time t. That we have:
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt)
−θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) ≤ 0
and
V˙t = −θ2e−θ1(1−t)
(
CS2 − CSmin
)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) .
Again, to see whether the consumer’s preference for store i = 1 over store i = 2 becomes
stronger or weaker over time, we differentiate (13) with respect to time
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θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1V˙t
− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2V˙t
= θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)
+
(
θ1 − θ2) (θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt))
+ θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)− θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)
= θ2
(
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
− θ2
(
θ2e−θ
1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt)) ≤ 0.
Altogether, this implies that the consumers have no incentive to switch before they find a
price.47 In other words, they always prefer to search in the same firm’s store from the beginning
t = 0 up to the deadline t = 1 given that no price is found in the meantime. To identify which
store this is, note that, at the deadline t = 1, consumers prefer firm i = 1’s store over firm
i = 2’s store iff the following condition holds:
θ1CS1 ≥ θ2CS2.
Step 2: Value function
We can now also show how to derive the consumer value function Vt. Based on what we just
found in Step 1, it is without loss to assume that all consumers start from store i and switch to
store −i only when they find a price. Note first that
V˙ it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + CSmin − Vt
)
defines a linear first order differential equation
V˙ it − θiVt = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + CSmin.
)
.
A solution to the related homogenous equation is
Vt = ce
θit,
where c is a constant. To solve the non-homogenous equation, we can use the variation of the
constants method in which we let the constants c(t) be dependent on time such that
Vt = c(t)e
θit, V˙t = c(t)θ
ieθ
it + c′(t)eθ
it.
This implies that
V˙ it + θ
iVt = c
′(t)eθ
it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + CSmin
)
and
47Note that the derivative V˙t is well defined in both cases since the consumer has no incentive to switch
the firm: by continuity of (1), there exist no kink in Vt unless the consumer changes the store.
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c(t) = −
∫
θie−θ
ite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin)dt−
∫
θie−θ
itCSmindt+ d,
=
θi
θi − θ−i e
−θite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + e−θitCSmin + d,
where d is a constant. The consumer value is thereby given as
Vt =
(
θi
θi − θ−i e
−θite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + e−θitCSmin + d
)
eθ
it,
where the constant d is determined by the terminal condition
V1 =
θi
θi − θ−i (CS
i − CSmin) + CSmin + deθi = 0
implying
deθ
i
= − θ
i
θi − θ−i (CS
i − CSmin)− CSmin.
The general solution to the terminal value problem is given by
Vt = V
i
t =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
(CSi − CSmin) +
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
CSmin
= Bti
(
CSi − CSmin
)
+
(
1−Bt∅
)
CSmin = B
t
iCS
i +Bt1,2CSmin,
where
Bti =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
, for θi 6= θ−i,
Bti = e
θi(1−t), for θi = θ−i,
Bt1,2 =
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Prices
Step 1: General form of price distributions
Lemma 4 Assume Bi > 0, either for firm i = 1 or firm i = 2, and B1,2 > 0. Then, the
following hold true in any equilibrium:
1. The firms use randomized pricing strategies: F 1 and F 2.
2. Both F 1 and F 2 have the same interval support supp(F ) =
[
p, p¯
]
, where 0 < p < p¯ = 1.
3. Neither has an atom at p ∈ [p, 1): limx→p−F i(x) = F i(p) for all p < 1 and i = 1, 2.
4. If F 1 has an atom at p = 1, F 2 has not and, if F 2 has an atom at p = 1, F 1 has not.
We assume in this proof that B1,2 > 0 (there are shoppers) and B1 > 0 or B2 > 0 (there are
captives). We also take ε > 0 to represent some tiny (infinitesimal) number.
First, we analyze three cases to prove by contradiction that both firms mix in equilibrium.
In doing so, we make the assumption that one of the firms uses a pure strategy pi. Case 1:
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pi < min supp(F−i). As the demand Bi + B1,2 > 0 is unchanged as long as pi stays below
min supp(F−i), there is a profitable deviation for firm i from price pi to price pi + ε. Case 2:
pi > max supp(F−i). As the demand B−i + B1,2 > 0 is unchanged as long as pi stays above
max supp(F−i), there is a profitable deviation for firm −i from a price p ∈ supp(F−i) to a price
p+ ε. Case 3a: pi > 0 and pi ∈ supp(F−i). As the demand B−i +B1,2(1− F i(p)) jumps up at
p = pi, there is a profitable deviation for firm −i from price p−i to price p−i−ε. Case 3b: pi = 0
and 0 ∈ supp(F−i). Note that there are some captive consumers but, as both of the firms use the
price zero, both of them are making zero profit. Thus, the firm who has captive consumers has a
profitable deviation up from zero to extract some profit from the captive consumers. Altogether,
Cases 1, 2, 3a and 3b demonstrate that (i) both stores use randomized pricing strategies and
that (ii) both stores’ profit and prices are bounded away from zero.
Next, we consider the supports supp(F i) and supp(F−i) of the firm’s randomized strategies
F i and F−i. Suppose that supp(F i) 6= supp(F−i). This implies that there is some open set
U 6= ∅ such that, with no loss of generality, U ⊂ supp(F i) and U ∩ supp(F−i) = ∅. But now,
as the demand is unchanged for all pi ∈ U there is a profitable deviation up from the lower
prices in U to the higher prices in U . This shows that the firm mix over the same set of prices
supp(F ) := supp(F i) = supp(F−i).
Last, we examine the support for possible gaps and jumps/atoms and delineate its bound-
aries. Gaps: Suppose the support is not connected but has a gap
[
g, g
] ∪ supp(F ) = ∅ but for
some
[
g − ε, g] ∪ supp(F ) 6= ∅ and [g, g + ε] ∪ supp(F ) 6= ∅. Then, as the demand is unchanged
for all p ∈ [g, g], there is a profitable deviation from some price p ∈ [g − ε, g] to some price
p ∈ [g, g + ε]. Atoms: Suppose the strategy F i is not continuous but has an atom αi > 0 at
piα ∈ supp(F ). Then, as the demand from shoppers,
(
1− F i(p))B1,2, is reduced by αi at piα,
there is a profitable deviation for firm −i from a price piα or some price piα + ε to some price
piα − ε. This implies that there can be an atom at the upper bound only and used by a single
firm only; this makes sure the other firm does not use pα or any p
i
α + ε, from which it would
have a profitable deviation. Bounds: (i) Consider the highest price p the firms use. Note that
the firm who has that price is only selling to its captive consumers Bi > 0. Hence, there is a
profitable deviation up in p unless it equals 1. (ii) Consider the lowest price p the firms use.
As both of the stores make some profit, there is a profitable deviation up in price p unless it is
bounded away from 0.
Step 2: Closed form of price distributions
Based on above, we only need to determine the firms’ profits Πi, the lower bound p > 0 of
the support, whether we need an atom αi > 0 at the upper bound p¯ = 1 of the support for firm
i = 1 or i = 2, and the cumulative distribution functions F 1 and F 2.
Note first that, if firm i uses a price p = 1− , which lies just below the upper bound, it sells
to its captives with probability one and to the shoppers with probability α−i, which gives the
likelihood that firm −i has the price p = 1. Evaluated at the upper bound the firm’s profit is
thus given by Πi = Bi + α
−iB1,2, for i = 1, 2.
Instead, by setting the lowest price p, the firm can attract both its captives and the shoppers
with probability one. Evaluated at the lower bound the firm’s profit hence becomes Πi =
(Bi +B1,2) p, for i = 1, 2. As the profit has to be the same over the whole support to sustain
randomized pricing strategies, equating
Πi = Bi + α
−iB1,2 = (Bi +B1,2) p
for i = 1 and i = 2 gives us the lower bound
p =
Bi + α
−iB1,2
Bi +B1,2
=
B−i + αiB1,2
B−i +B1,2
.
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Assuming Bi ≥ B−i, this is solvable only if αi = Bi−B−iBi+B1,2 ≥ 0 implying α−i = 0. To simplify,
we hence refer to αi by the shorter notion α. The profits can thus be written as Πi = Bi and
Π−i = B−i + αB1,2 and the lower bound is p = BiBi+B1,2 .
The cumulative distribution functions F 1 and F 2 can now be obtained in closed-form by
observing that the profit has to be invariant everywhere in the support. In particular, if a firm
i = 1, 2 sets price p, its profit is expressed as follows
Πi =
(
Bi + (1− F−i(p))B1,2
)
p, for i = 1, 2,
which gives
F i(p) =
B−i +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
−i
B1,2
1
p
, for p ≤ 1,
as required.
Observe also that the profit Π−i ≤ Πi can be rewritten as a convex combination of firm i’s
captives and firm −i’s captives
Π−i = B−i + αB1,2 = B−i +
Bi −B−i
Bi +B1,2
B1,2
Π−i =
(
1− B1,2
Bi +B1,2
)
B−i +
B1,2
Bi +B1,2
Bi
Π−i = pB−i + (1− p)Bi,
Also, if we continue still with that last expression we get,
Π−i = −p (Bi −B−i) +Bi
= − Bi
Bi +B1,2
(Bi −B−i) +Bi
=
(
1− Bi −B−i
Bi +B1,2
)
Bi
= (1− α) Πi.
This expression will be needed a bit later in the paper.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Effects of higher search efficiency
By Lemma 2, a firm’s profit depends on which of the firms has a higher number of captives.
According to Equations (3) and (4), the fastest firm has more captives, B1 > B2, if and only if
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 −B0
)
≥ θ
2
θ1 − θ2
(
B0 − e−θ1
)
⇐⇒ B0 ≤ θ
1e−θ2 − θ2e−θ1
θ1 − θ2 ⇐⇒ s
1 ≥ θ
2
θ1 + θ2
.
As a result, when search is less efficient than s1 = θ
2
θ1+θ2
, the profits are
Π1 = B1 +
B2 −B1
B2 +B1,2
B1,2 and Π
2 = B2
but, when search is more efficient than s1 = θ
2
θ1+θ2
, the profits become
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Π1 = B1 and Π
2 = B2 +
B1 −B2
B1 +B1,2
B1,2.
For any given θ, the derivatives of B1 and B1 with respect to s
1 are denoted by B′1(s1) > 0
and B′1(s1) < 0. This gives the effect on the larger profit, which is B2 for s1 <
θ2
θ1+θ2
and B1
for s1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
. To obtain the effect on the smaller profit, we next differentiate it with respect
to s1.
B1 +
B2 −B1
B2 +B1,2
B1,2
is increasing in s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
when B1 < B2 iff
B′1B2(B2 +B1,2) > −B′2B1,2(B1 +B1,2). (14)
By calculating the derivatives from Equations (3) and (4), we next obtain that
B′1
B′2
=
θ1
θ2
=: ρ > 1,
which allows us to rewrite (14) as a second order polynomial inequality in B1,2
B21,2 − (ρB2 −B1)− ρB2 < 0.
The lhs is an upward-opening parabola with a negative and a positive root and the inequality
(14) is therefore satisfied for all values of B1, 2 ∈ (0, 1) which lie below the positive root located
at
B1,2 =
(ρB2 −B1) +
√
(ρB2 −B1)2 + 4ρB2
2
> 1.
This shows that Π1 increases for all values of s1 and essentially similar analysis demonstrates
that Π2 decreases for all values of s1.
We turn to consumer surplus and reformulate it:
CS = B1
(
1− E [p1])+B2 (1− E [p2])+B1,2 (1− E [pmin])
= B1 +B2 +B1,2 −B1E
[
p1
]−B2E [p2]−B1,2E [pmin]
= 1−B0 −B1E
[
p1
]−B2E [p2]−B1,2E [pmin] ,
where 1 − B0 captures the positive welfare effects and B1E
[
p1
] − B2E [p2] − B1,2E [pmin] the
negative effects on prices. We study it more closely next.
Expected prices differ for s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
and s1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
. We start from the latter case by
applying the expected prices derived earlier in (6), (7), and (8)
B1E
[
p1
]
+B2E
[
p2
]
+B1,2E [pmin] =
B1
[
Π2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
+ α
]
+B2
[
Π1
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)]
+B1,2
[
2Π1Π2
B21,2
(
1− p
p
)
− B1Π
2 +B2Π
1
B21,2
ln
(
1
p
)]
=
αB1 + 2B2 +
(
B1Π
2
B1,2
+
B2Π
1
B1,2
− Π
2
B1,2
− Π
2
B1,2
)
ln
(
1
p
)
= αB1 + 2B2 + 2αB1,2
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Joining the results gives a surprisingly simple expression for consumer surplus for s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
B1 +B2 +B1,2 − (αB1 + 2B2 + 2αB1,2) = (1− α)B1 −B2 + (1− 2α)B1,2 =
B1 −B2 − αB1 + (1− 2α)B1,2 = (B1 −B2)(1− B1
B1 +B1,2
) + (1− 2α)B1,2 =
(B1 −B2) B1,2
B1 +B1,2
+ (1− 2α)B1,2 = αB1,2 + (1− 2α)B1,2 = (1− α)B1,2
Given that the case where s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
is identical, we can now rewrite consumer surplus as
CS = (1− α)B1,2 =

(
1− B2−B1B2+B1,2
)
B1,2, for s
1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
,(
1− B1−B1B1+B1,2
)
B1,2, for s
1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
.
We know that B1 is increasing and B2 is decreasing in s
1 whereas B1,2 is unaffected by s
1.
Thus, consumers surplus is increasing for s1 < θ
2
θ1+θ2
and decreasing for s1 > θ
2
θ1+θ2
.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Fixed point in search and prices
Note first that by Lemma 1, if
θ1
(
1− E [p1]) > θ2 (1− E [p2]) .
then all consumers start from firm i = 1, i.e., s1 = 1− s2 = 1, whereas, if
θ1
(
1− E [p1]) < θ2 (1− E [p2]) .
then all consumers start from firm i = 2, i.e., s1 = 1− s2 = 0. Otherwise, if
θ1
(
1− E [p1]) = θ2 (1− E [p2]) .
then any s1 = 1− s2 ∈ [0, 1] and s2 ∈ [0, 1] such that s1 = 1− s2 would do.
As discussed in the main text, remember that we can always assign a unique joint price
distribution F := (F 1, F 2) to any frictions inside stores, θ, and fractions of consumers start-
ing from each firm, s. Namely, together θ and s generate a unique partition of consumers
{B0, B1, B2, B1,2}, which then in turn gives us a unique joint price distribution F characterized
by Lemma 2; the marginals can be denoted by F i(θ, s) = F i(θ1, θ2, s1, s2). This notation will
be helpful in describing the relationship between frictions θ, search s, and prices F.
Note first that, if θ1
(
1− E [p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))]) ≥ θ2 (1− E [p2|(θ, s = (1, 0))])), then the
pair F(θ, s = (1, 0)) and s = (1, 0) is a fixed point. In other words, the price ratio which would
arise if all consumers began from store i = 1, E
[
p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))] /E [p2|(θ, s = (1, 0))], is not
too high to discourage consumers from starting from that more expensive firm.
It is also clear that, if we started to increase the fraction s1, starting from the level s? where
the firms have equally many captives B1 = B2 for the given level of frictions and raising s
1
gradually up to one, by continuity of E
[
p1|(θ, s)] /E [p2|(θ, s)] in s, we must span all the values
of E
[
p1
]
/E
[
p2
]
between one and E
[
p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))] /E [p2|(θ, s = (1, 0))].
Hence, if we concentrate on cases where
θ1
(
1− E [p1|(θ, s = (1, 0))]) < θ2 (1− E [p2|(θ, s = (1, 0))]))
and θ1 > θ2 for which we would have
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θ1
(
1− E [p1|(θ, (s?, 1− s?))]) > θ2 (1− E [p2|(θ, (s?, 1− s?))])) ,
by continuity there necessarily exists a fixed point in search and prices, where s in between
s = (1, 0) and s = (s?, 1− s?) and the following equality holds
θ1
θ2
=
1− E [p2|(θ, s)]
1− E [p1|(θ, s)] . (15)
To elaborate on this, if (15) is satisfied, all consumers are indifferent between starting from
either firm. Each of them can hence be assigned to any start store. If they are assigned according
to s, the firms are willing to price in accordance with F(θ, s): we have a fixed point.
Observe also that in the symmetric case with θ1 = θ2 we have a symmetric fixed point
θ1
(
1− E [p1|(θ, (s?, 1− s?))]) = θ2 (1− E [p2|(θ, (s?, 1− s?))])) .
For uniqueness, we can rely on the monotonicity of E
[
p1|(θ, s)] /E [p2|(θ, s)] in s:
1− E [p2|(θ, s)]
1− E [p1|(θ, s)] =
1− Π2B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1− pB2+(1−p)B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1 +
pB1−pB2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
− B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1 + α B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=1− α,
where
∂α
∂s1
=
∂
∂s1
(
B1 −B2
B1 +B1,2
)
> 0,
because ∂B1
∂s1
> 0, ∂B2
∂s1
< 0 and
∂B1,2
∂s1
= 0; these partials are easy to sign based on (2), (3), (4)
and (5). As a result, as we increase s1, starting from the point s? where B1 = B2 holds, all the
way up until unity, E
[
p1|(θ, s)] /E [p2|(θ, s)] decreases: the fixed point is unique.
PROOF OF REMARK 1: No Bertrand equilibrium
Bertrand equilibrium requires that both firms choose zero frictions θ = (∞,∞). Yet, both firms
gain if one of them deviates to some finite rate θ because it raises their profit up from zero to
BiB1,2
Bi+B1,2
=
(
1− e−θ) e−θ (to the deviator, who has the start share s−i = 0 due to its positive
frictions θ−i <∞) and Bi = 1−e−θ (to the non-deviator, who gets all starting consumers si = 1
thanks to its markedly lower frictions θi =∞).
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PROOF OF REMARK 2: No Diamond equilibrium
As the consumers always search, Diamond equilibrium requires that at least one of the firms has
infinite frictions and is therefore practically out of the market, θ =
(
θi, 0
)
,
(
0, θ−i
)
. Its profit
equals zero because it serves nobody. However, for any lower level of frictions, the firm’s profit
is positive, as a prominent firm Πi = Bi > 0 or the non-prominent firm Π
−i = (1− α)Bi > 0.
There is hence a profitable deviation to higher θ′ > 0.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Efficient search, prominence order
We just proved that for s1 < 1,
θ2
θ1
= 1− α
θ2
θ1
=
B2 +B1,2
B1 +B1,2
θ2
θ1
=
1−B0 −B1
1−B0 −B2
θ2
θ1
=
1−B0
(
1− θ1
θ1−θ2
)
− θ1
θ1−θ2 e
−θ2
1−B0
(
1 + θ
2
θ1−θ2
)
+ θ
1
θ2−θ2 e
−θ1
θ2
θ1
=
θ1 − θ2 + θ2B0 − θ1e−θ2
θ1 − θ2 + θ2e−θ1 − θ1B0
.
We can hence solve for B0 as
B0 = −1
2
θ2
θ1
(
1− e−θ1
)
− 1
2
θ1
θ2
(
1− e−θ2
)
+ 1.
From here on, it is useful to work with the reparametrization ρ = θ
2
θ1
, which gives
B0 = −1
2
ρ
(
1− e−θ1
)
− 1
2
ρ−1
(
1− e−θ2
)
+ 1.
Now, since ∂θ
1
∂ρ = − θ
1
ρ and
∂θ2
∂ρ =
θ2
ρ ,
∂B0
∂ρ
= −1
2
(
1− e−θ1
)
+
1
2
θ1e−θ
1
+
1
2
ρ−1
(
1− e−θ2
)
+
1
2
ρ−2θ2e−θ
2
or, returning to the original variables,
∂B0
∂ρ
=
1
2
(
−
(
1− e−θ1 − θ1e−θ1
)
+
θ1
θ2
(
1− e−θ2 + θ1e−θ2
))
.
This is positive for all θ1 ≥ θ2 > 0 because
1− e−θ1 − θ1e−θ1
θ1
<
1− e−θ1
θ1
<
1− e−θ2
θ2
<
1− e−θ2 + θ1e−θ2
θ2
and the function 1−e
−x
x is decreasing in x.
We can now revert to ρ = θ
2
θ1
= 1−B0−B11−B0−B2 to solve it for B1 and B2 as a function of ρ
B1 = (1− ρ) (1−B0) + ρB2,
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B2 =
(
1− ρ−1) (1−B0) + ρ−1B1.
Their partials with respect to ρ are given by
∂B1
∂ρ
= − (1−B0 −B2)− (1− ρ) ∂B0
∂ρ
+ ρ
∂B2
∂ρ
,
∂B2
∂ρ
= ρ−1 (1−B0 −B1)−
(
1− ρ−1) ∂B0
∂ρ
+ ρ−1
∂B1
∂ρ
.
As we can now take ρ = ρ(θ1, θ2) as a firm’s choice variable, the first order conditions are
∂Π1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ∂B1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ρ∂B2
∂ρ
= 1−B0 −B2 + (1− ρ) ∂B0
∂ρ
> 0
and
∂Π2
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ∂(1− α)Π
1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ∂ρB1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ B1 + ρ∂B1
∂ρ
= 0.
Both of them cannot be satisfied for the same ρ 6= 1 because a firm’s profit is positive,
Π1 = B1 > 0. This implies that it cannot be optimal for both firms to use such rates θ
1 and θ2
that s1 < 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: No efficient equilibrium with
zero frictions in prominent store
We consider case by case firm i’s best response, θi, to firm −i’s frictions, θ−i.
Case 1: θ−i = 0.
If firm −i is out of the market, firm i acts like a monopolist and serves its consumers
instantaneously: θi =∞.
Case 2: θ−i ∈ (0,∞).
First, if the firm chooses an extremely slow rate θi = 0 it serves nobody and extracts no
profits.48
Second, if the firm chooses an extremely fast rate θi =∞ such that si = 1, the firm’s profit
is given as49
Πi = e−θ
−i
.
Third, if the firm chooses a finite but sufficiently fast rate θi >> θ−i such that si = 1, the
firm’s profit can be written as
Πi =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
1− e−(θi−θ−i)
)
e−θ
−i
.
It is now easy to show that
θi
θi − θ−i
(
1− e−(θi−θ−i)
)
> 1
48For θi = 0, B−i = 1− e−θ−i and B0 = e−θ−i while Bi = B1,2 = 0.
49For θi =∞, Bi = e−θ−i and B1,2 = 1− e−θ−i while B−i = B0 = 0.
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as long as
∣∣θi − 1∣∣ > ∣∣θ−i − 1∣∣.
This implies that, by choosing a large enough finite θi, the firm is guaranteed to extract
more revenue than by choosing θi = 0 or θi =∞.
Case 3: θ−i =∞.
Note first that, if both firms have an infinite rate, θi =∞, all consumers find all prices and
both firms’ profits go to zero.
Instead, if firm −i has an infinite rate and firm i has a finite rate, θ−i =∞ and θi <∞ such
that s−i = 1, firm i’s profit is50
Πi =
B−i −Bi
B−i +B1,2
B1,2 = e
−θi
(
1− e−θi
)
,
It is maximized by θi = ln(2) <∞.
It is thus clear from Cases 1, 2 and 3 that θi =∞ cannot arise in equilibrium.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Equally many informed con-
sumers and uninformed consumers
For values outside of the boundary where θ
2
θ1
= 1− α, the first order condition is
∂B1
∂θ2
(1−B0 −B1)− ∂B1
∂θ2
B1 = 0
where B1,2 = 1−B0 −B1. The unique solution is thereby given by B1 = B1,2.
Note also that ∂B1
∂θ2
≤ 0 because
B1 = θ
1e−θ
1 eδ − 1
δ
and ∂∂δ
eδ−1
δ ≥ 0 and ∂∂θ2 δ = −1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: Equilibrium obfuscation
Suppose that the other firm has chosen rate θ. We consider separately a firm’s the upper best
response to θ′ > θ, symmetric response to θ′ = θ and lower best response θ′ < θ. By Lemma
3, we know already that there exist no symmetric equilibrium where θ′ = θ or asymmetric
equilibrium where s1 < 1. However, to pind down the equilibrium, we need to consider both
upper and lower deviations and allow for also the possibility that s1 < 1.
We already know that, if s1 = 1 (Lemma 2),
Π1 = B1 =
θ1
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2),Π2 = (1− α)B1 = B1B1,2
B1 +B1, 2
. (16)
whereas, if s1 < 1, then we have (Prop. 2)
Π1 = B1 = s
1 θ
1
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2),Π2 = (1− α)B1 = θ2
θ1
B1. (17)
We first study the case s1 = 1 to identify a candidate equilibrium and then check that there
are no profitable deviations even if we allow for s1 < 1.
50Here, B−i = e−θ
i
and B1,2 = 1− e−θi whereas Bi = B0 = 0.
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Step 1: Fixed point of a relaxed problem where s1 = 1.
Now the prominent firm’s upper best response θ1 is given by the first order condition
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)2
(
e−θ
2 − eθ1
)
= θ1e−θ
1
, (18)
and the non-prominent firm’s lower best response θ2 is given by the first order condition
θ1
(θ1 − θ2)
(
e−θ
2 − eθ1
)
=
1− e−θ1
2
. (19)
Note that the maximizer of the prominent firm’s problem θ1(θ2)? is decreasing in θ2 and the
maximizer of the non-prominent firm’s problem θ2(θ1)? is decreasing in θ1. Firms’ equilibrium
obfuscations are thus strategic substitutes.
Joining these gives the equations
1
2
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
=
e(θ
1−θ2) − 1
(θ1 − θ2) =
θ1
θ2
,
that have the unique solution of
θ? ≈ (2.76, 1.03).
This generates the following profits to the prominent firm and the non-prominent firm,
respectively,
(Π1)? ≈ 2.76
2.76− 1.03
(
e−1.03 − e−2.76) ≈ 0.469 (20)
(Π2)? ≈ 0.5 2.76
2.76− 1.03
(
e−1.03 − e−2.76) ≈ 0.234. (21)
Step 2: No profitable deviations allowing for any s1.
Note that in this part we exceptionally allow for the possibility that θ1 < θ2 reversing the
usual prominence order: here the faster firm can become the slower firm, and vice versa. In
comparing the profits that a firm obtains, a noteworthy observation that can be made from (16)
and (17) is that
Π1 =

B1 =
θ1
θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s1 = 1
B1 = s
1 θ1
θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s1 ∈ (0, 1) and θ1 ≥ θ2
(1− α)B2 = (1− s1) θ1θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s1 ∈ (0, 1) and θ1 ≤ θ2
(1− α)B2 = (1− α) θ2θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s1 = 0
and, similarly,
Π2 =

B2 =
θ2
θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s2 = 1
B2 = s
2 θ2
θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s2 ∈ (0, 1) and θ2 ≥ θ1
(1− α)B1 = (1− s2) θ2θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s2 ∈ (0, 1) and θ2 ≤ θ1
(1− α)B1 = (1− α) θ1θ2−θ1
(
e−θ1 − e−θ2), for s2 = 0
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This implies that, when si > 0, we can approximate the profit of firm i from above by
Π
i
(θ1, θ2) :=
θi
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2).
This upper bound gives the exact profit of firm i when si = 1 but is strictly greater than it
when si ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, when si = 0, the profit of firm i is equal to
Πi(θ1, θ2) :=
B−iB1,2
B−i +B1,2
=
B−i(1− e−θ−i −B−i)
1− e−θ−i
where
B−i =
θ−i
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2).
The maximum profit that firm i can get for any fixed θ−i is hence given by
Π˜i(θ−i) := max
θi
{
Π
i
(θi, θ−i),Πi(θi, θ−i)
}
Hence, there are no profitable unilateral deviations from the candidate equilibrium θ? ≈
(2.76, 1.03) for either of the firms if the following two conditions are satisfied
Π1(θ?) ≥ Π˜1(θ2?) and Π2(θ?) ≥ Π˜2(θ1?).
We show this next by studying the local maxima and local minima of Πi(θ1, θ2) and Πi(θ1, θ2),
separately, for θ1 fixed to (θ1?) ≈ 2.76 and then for θ2 fixed to (θ2?) ≈ 1.03.
(i) We start by considering Π
2
(θ1?, θ2) to which we refer for concreteness by Π
2
(2.76, θ2).51
We differentiate this with respect to θ2 to get its first derivative
−2.76
(θ2 − 2.76)2
(
e−2.76 − e−θ2)+ θ2
θ2 − 2.76e
−θ2
This is positive for θ2 < θ2′ ≈ 1.75 and negative thereafter. There is hence a global maximum,
at θ2 = θ2′ ≈ 1.75.
(ii) We continue by analyzing Π
1
(θ1, θ2?) to which we refer similarly as above by Π
1
(θ1, 1.03).
We differentiate this with respect to θ1 to get its first derivative
−1.03
(θ1 − 1.03)2
(
e−1.03 − e−θ1)+ θ1
θ1 − 1.03e
−θ1
This is positive for θ1 < θ1? ≈ 2.76 and negative thereafter. There is again a global maximum,
at θ1 = θ1? ≈ 2.76.
(iii) We move on to Π2(θ1?, θ2) and Π1(θ1, θ2?), which have the same general form
B−iB1,2
B−i +B1,2
=
B−i(1− eθ−i −B−i)
1− eθ−i .
Both of them are hence first increasing in θi (for B−i < B1,2) and thereafter decreasing in θi (for
B−i > B1,2). The maximum is given by B−i = B1,2 = (1 − B0)/2, which gives us immediately
an upper bound for the value attained by function Πi
51By continuity, the difference
∣∣∣Π2(θ1?, θ2)−Π2(2.76, θ2)∣∣∣ or ∣∣∣Π1(θ1, θ2?)−Π1(θ1, 1.03)∣∣∣ is small.
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Πi(θi, θ−i) ≤ B
2
−i
2B−i
=
B2−i
2B−i
=
B−i
2
=
1− e−θ−i
4
To complete the proof we observe that firm i = 1 has no profitable deviation downwards and
nor does firm i = 1 have a profitable deviation upwards because
1− e−1.03
4
≈ 0.321 < 0.469, and 1.75
1.75− 2.76
(
e−2.76 − e−1.75) ≈ 0.191 < 0.234.
Note also that 2.76
(
1− E [p1]) > 1.03 (1− E [p2]), which implies that indeed s1 = 1. The
expected prices can be calculated based on (6) and (7).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: Obfuscation and advertizing with
two firms
Proposition 6 is written in a self-explanatory way building on previous Lemma 2 and the proofs
of Propositions 3, 4 and 5. Only conceptual changes are involved in moving from partition B = 1
into partition A+B = 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: Prices with three firms
We derive equilibrium profits.
The basic logic in the proof is standard and similar to that in Lemmata 4 and 2. We do
not repeat all those steps here. We only sketch the main points where analysis might departure
from the standard one.
All the firms must earn equally high profits at p < 1 and at p = 1. For each firm who uses
the lowest prices p this implies that, respectively from the 1st prominent to the 2nd and the 3rd
prominent firms,
Π1 = C1 = (C1 + C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3)p,
Π2 = C2 + αC1,2 = (C2 + C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p,
Π3 = C3 + αC1,3 = (C3 + C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p.
The optimality condition of the 1st prominent firm determines the lowest price p = p1
p1 =
C1
C1 + (C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3)
,
and the optimality condition of the 3rd prominent firm pins down the atom size α = α3
α3 =
(C3 + C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p− C3
C1,3
,
=
C3+(C1,3+C2,3+C1,2,3)
C1+(C1,2+C1,3+C1,2,3)
C1 − C3
C1,3
,
=
C3 + (C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
C1 + (C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3)
C1
C1,3
− C3
C1,3
.
Note that the atom size is here larger than it would be were it derived from the similar optimality
condition for the 2nd or 1st prominent firm
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α3 =
(C3 + C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p
1 − C3
C1,3
>
α2 =
(C2 + C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p
1 − C2
C1,2
.
This guarantees that no firm strictly prefers to undercut the lowest prices, which would otherwise
constitute a profitable deviation. Particularly, if the 3rd prominent firm has no incentive to
deviate below the lowest price, then neither does the 2nd prominent firm
Indeed, here only the 1st prominent and the 3rd prominent firms apply the lowest prices in
the neighborhood of p1. For this atom size, the 2nd prominent firm earns so much profit that it
has no incentive to charge a price below p2 ∈ (p1, 1), which is given by
Π2 = C2 + αC1,2 = (C2 + C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p
2.
The equilibrium price distributions can now be derived from profit equivalence requirements
Π1 = (C1 + C1,2(1− F2(p)) + C1,3(1− F3(p)) + C1,2,3(1− F2(p))(1− F3(p)))p, for p ∈ (p1, 1)
Π2 = (C2 + C1,2(1− F1(p)) + C2,3(1− F3(p)) + C1,2,3(1− F1(p))(1− F3(p)))p, for p ∈ (p2, 1)
Π3 = (C3 + C1,3(1− F1(p)) + C2,3(1− F2(p)) + C1,2,3(1− F1(p))(1− F2(p)))p, for p ∈ (p1, 1)
For any given price p ≥ p′, we can use the first equation to solve for φ3 := 1 − F3(p), the
second equation to solve for φ1 := 1−F1(p), and the third equation to solve for φ2 := 1−F2(p)
as
φ3(φ2, p) = min
{
max
{
Π1/p− C1 − C1,2φ2
C1,3 + C1,2,3φ2
, 0
}
, 1
}
φ1(φ3, p) = min
{
max
{
Π2/p− C2 − C2,3φ3
C1,2 + C1,2,3φ3
, 0
}
, 1
}
φ2(φ1, p) = min
{
max
{
Π3/p− C3 − C1,3φ1
C2,3 + C1,2,3φ1
, 0
}
, 1
}
Obviously, φ2 is decreasing in φ1, which is decreasing in φ3, which is decreasing in φ3. This
implies that the composite function which is defined by φ := φ2 ◦φ1 ◦φ3(φ′2) is decreasing in φ′2.
Function φ maps a unique φ2 to any φ2′ for all p ∈ (p2, 1) and, when φ2 = 1, it maps a unique φ3
to any φ3′ for all p ∈ (p1, p2). By continuity of φ in p and φ′2 or φ′3, a unique continuous (almost
everywhere) equilibrium price distribution exists if and only if φ2(φ1(φ3(0))) ≥ φ2(φ1(φ3(1)))
for all p ∈ (p2, 1). This inequality must clearly hold because φ is decreasing in φ′2. At price
unity p = 1, the unique fixed point is φ2 = 0, φ3 = 0 and φ1 = α.
Note that in certain cases it might be possible to construct an equilibrium where the roles
of the 1st and 2nd prominent firms are reversed but the logic is otherwise identical
Π1 = C1 + α
3C1,2 = (C1 + C1,2 + C1,3 + C1,2,3)p
1,
Π2 = C2 = (C2 + C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p
2,
Π3 = C3 + α
3C2,3 = (C3 + C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p
2.
Again, the optimality condition of the 3rd prominent firm pins down the atom size α = α3
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α3 =
(C3 + C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)p
2 − C3
C2,3
,
=
C3+(C1,3+C2,3+C1,2,3)
C2+(C1,2+C2,3+C1,2,3)
C1 − C3
C2,3
,
=
C3 + (C1,3 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
C2 + (C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
C1
C2,3
− C3
C2,3
,
but the optimality condition of the 2st prominent firm determines the lowest price p = p2
p2 =
C2
C2 + (C1,2 + C2,3 + C1,2,3)
.
For this equilibrium type to exist, it must hold that C2 > 0 and C2,3 > 0, which here implies
also C1 > 0 and C1,2 > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: Obfuscation and advertizing with
three firms
We have assumed that C2 = C3 = C2,3 = 0.
The 1st prominent firm maximizes
C1,
and the 3rd prominent firm maximizes
C1(C1,3 + C1,2,3)
1− C0 ,
and the 2nd prominent firm maximizes
C1(C1,3 + C1,2,3)
1− C0
C1,2
C1,3
.
We have assumed that a fraction s2 (s3) of consumers B follows the path from the 1st
prominent firm to the 2nd (3rd) prominent firm and only then to the 3rd (2nd) prominent firm.
We refer to these consumers by B(s2) and B(s3), respectively, where s3 = 1 − s2 ≤ 1/2 and
B(s3) ≤ B(s2). Naturally,
∂B1(s
2)
∂θ2
+
∂B1,2(s
2)
∂θ2
+
∂B1,2,3(s
2)
∂θ2
= 0,
∂B1,3(s
3)
∂θ2
+
∂B1,2,3(s
3)
∂θ2
= 0
∂B1(s
3)
∂θ3
+
∂B1,3(s
3)
∂θ3
+
∂B1,2,3(s
3)
∂θ3
= 0,
∂B1,2(s
2)
∂θ3
+
∂B1,2,3(s
2)
∂θ3
= 0.
We have retained from the Poisson setting the assumption that the initial order of firms does
not affect how many consumers find two prices in the end,
∂B1,2,3(s2)
∂θi
=
∂B1,2,3(s3)
∂θi
for i = 2, 3.
The first order condition of the 1st prominent firm is
∂B1
∂θ1
= 0
The first order condition of the 3rd prominent firm is
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∂C1
∂θ3
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) +
(
∂C1,3
∂θ3
+
∂C1,2,3
∂θ3
)
C1 = 0
C1 =
∂C1
∂θ3
−
(
∂C1,3
∂θ3
+
∂C1,2,3
∂θ3
)(C1,3 + C1,2,3)
C1 =
∂C1
∂θ3
∂C1
∂θ3
+
∂C1,2
∂θ3
(C1,3 + C1,2,3)
where a higher rate θ3 reduces both C1(s
3) and C1,2(s
2) such that
∂C1
∂θ3
∂C1
∂θ3
+
∂C1,2
∂θ3
< 1.
The first order condition of the 2nd prominent firm is
(
∂C1
∂θ2
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) +
(
∂C1,3
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2,3
∂θ2
)
C1
)
C1,2
C1,3
+ C1(C1,2 + C1,2,3)
C1,2
∂C1,3
∂θ2
− C1,2 ∂C1,3∂θ2
C21,3
= 0
(
∂C1
∂θ2
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) +
(
∂C1,3
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2,3
∂θ2
)
C1
)
+ C1(C1,2 + C1,2,3)
(
∂C1,2
∂θ2
C1,2
−
∂C1,3
∂θ2
C1,3
)
= 0
(
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
)
C1 =
∂C1
∂θ2
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) + C1(C1,2 + C1,2,3)
(
∂C1,2
∂θ2
C1,2
−
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
C1,3
)
C1 =
∂C1
∂θ2
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) + C1(C1,2 + C1,2,3)
 ∂C1,2∂θ2
C1,2
(
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
) − ∂C1∂θ2 + ∂C1,2∂θ2
C1,3
(
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
)

C1 =
∂C1
∂θ2
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) + C1(C1,2 + C1,2,3)
(
1
C1,2
∂C1,2
∂θ2
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
− 1
C1,3
)
C1 =
∂C1
∂θ2
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
(C1,3 + C1,2,3) + C1(C1,2 + C1,2,3)
(
1
C1,2
∂C1,2
∂θ2
∂C1,3
∂θ2
− 1
C1,3
)
In this equilibrium type it should hold that
C1,2
C1,3
≥ 1 and
∂C1,2
∂θ2
∂C1,3
∂θ2
=
∂C1,2,3(s2)
∂θ2
+ ∂C1
∂θ2
∂C1,2,3(s3)
∂θ2
≤ 1,
This implies that
∂C1,2
∂θ2
C1,2
≤
∂C1,3
∂θ2
C1,3
and thus also that
∂C1
∂θ2
∂C1
∂θ2
+
∂C1,2
∂θ2
≥
∂C1
∂θ3
∂C1
∂θ3
+
∂C1,2
∂θ3
.
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